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THE REVISIONISTS REVISED:
STUDIES IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN EDUCATION

A review by

Diane Ravitch
Teachers College
Columbia University

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BOOK REVIEW*

Diane Ravitch
Teachers College
Columbia University

The Revisionists Revised:
Studies in the Historiography of American Education

Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life, by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis. New York: Basic Books, 1976. 340pp. \$13.95.

Reason and Rhetoric: The Intellectual Foundations of Twentieth Century Liberal Educational Policy, by Walter Feinberg. New York: Wiley, 1975. 287pp. \$11.00.

Work, Technology, and Education: Dissenting Essays in the Intellectual Foundations of American Education, edited by Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975. 222pp. \$10.00.

The Great School Legend: A Revisionist Interpretation of American Public Education, by Colin Greer. New York: Basic Books, 1972. 206pp. \$6.95.

Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century, by Clarence J. Karier, Paul Violas, and Joel Spring. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973. 243pp. \$5.95.

Shaping the American Educational State: 1900 to the Present, edited by Clarence J. Karier. New York: Free Press, 1975. 439pp. \$10.95 (paper, \$5.95).

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Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America, by Michael Katz. New York: Praeger, 1971. 158pp. \$5.95.

The Irony of Early School Reform: Educational Innovation in Mid-nineteenth Century Massachusetts, by Michael Katz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. 325pp. \$14.00 (paper, \$2.95).

Education and the Rise of the Corporate State, by Joel H. Spring. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972. 206pp. \$7.95.

A Primer of Libertarian Education, by Joel H. Spring. New York: Free Life Editions, 1975. 157pp. \$3.95.

I

Two significant revisionist trends appeared in American historiography in the early 1960s. The first, initiated in 1955 by Richard Hofstadter's The Age of Reform, was a re-evaluation of the progressive era, with all its troublesome and illiberal strains. This critical reconsideration of the progressive-liberal tradition, which had claimed the automatic loyalty of many historians, caused one historian to predict, with a sense of relief, "It now seems possible, at long last, to deal dispassionately with certain subjects which have been for decades hidden under a hard crust of political and ideological attachments." Henceforth, the historian would have to examine not just the bright, democratic side of progressivism, but its elitist, antidemocratic underside as well. The second trend, reflecting a growing impatience with the slow rate of social change in the United States, undertook not merely a reassessment of liberalism but a repudiation of it. Referred to as radical revisionism, it outspokenly declared its ideological and political attachments and relentlessly castigated progressives and liberals for reforming the American state without fundamentally altering it. In the radical revisionist view,¹ the progressive-liberal tradition itself was defective.

In the field of American educational historiography, similar critiques emerged. One aimed at shaking off the

constraints of past historical interpretations and widening the scope of the field; the other was a radical critique of both public schooling and the liberal tradition.

The first of these reinterpretations dates from 1960 when Harvard historian Bernard Bailyn criticized the inadequacies of the dominant tradition in educational historiography. In Education and the Forming of American Society, Bailyn characterized the conventional works of educational history as "the patristic literature of a powerful academic ecclesia," which had been written "in almost total isolation from the major influences and shaping minds of twentieth-century historiography." He described their authors as "educational missionaries" who, seeking to dignify their profession, had "directed their attention almost exclusively to the part of the educational process carried on in formal institutions of instruction." By perceiving education so narrowly, "they lost the capacity to see it in its full context and hence to assess the variety and magnitude of the burdens it had borne and to judge its historical importance." Urging other historians "to see education in its elaborate, intricate involvement with the rest of society," Bailyn looked forward to a new historiography that would investigate family, church, community, economic factors, and any other topics that might contribute to understanding the "process and content of cultural transfer."²

Five years after the appearance of Bailyn's essay, Lawrence A. Cremin, an educational historian at Teachers College, furthered this revision of the traditional historiography in his book The Wonderful World of Elwood Patterson Gubberley. Cremin identified Gubberley as the most influential proponent of the view that the story of the public school was the first quarter of the twentieth century with the patriotic fervor of his time, depicted the emergence of the American public school as the capstone of a long series of struggles between the forces of progress and the forces of reaction. At every critical juncture, Gubberley wrote, the public school triumphed over the bigots and penny-pinching conservatives who tried to block its way. Gubberley's writings, particularly Public Education in the United States,³ were standard fare in professional schools of education.

Cremín agreed with Bailyn that Cubberley's interpretation was deeply flawed: first, by anachronism--he searched the past for the seeds of the modern public school and discarded those parts of the past that did not serve his purpose; second, by parochialism--he confused schooling with education and ignored the importance of other agencies of education; and third, by evangelism--he used history to inspire zeal in the ranks of a fledgling education profession rather than trying to understand the past on its own terms. As early as 1952, Cremín had recognized the Cubberleyan version of history as an optimistically distorted portrait "of educational struggles which had been waged and won, and enemies which had been routed and destroyed." One consequence of this smug perspective, Cremín argued in 1965, was that "by portraying the great battles as over and won, it had helped to produce a generation of schoolmen unable to comprehend--much less contend with--the great educational controversies following World War II." The Cubberleyan tradition, he concluded, was "narrowly institutional, full of anachronisms, and painfully moralistic." By 1970, Cremín addressed these concerns in his broad-ranging history of education in Colonial America, the first in a projected three-volume history of American education; in it, education is a process carried on in many different forms and agencies.

The Bailyn-Cremín critique proved to be liberating and fruitful. It broke down the artificial barriers that had isolated educational history from the mainstream of American history; it suggested the application of social science to historical inquiry; and it widened the vision of educational historians to include the perspectives of social history, intellectual history, urban history, religious history, and the history of science and technology.

In the ensuing years, a radical critique has been articulated in educational history, as it has in other areas of scholarship. Radical revisionists in the field have attempted to redefine the major contours of the past by repudiating progressive and liberal ideas and policies, particularly with respect to public schooling. There has been considerable overlap among the various revisionist approaches, since both radicals and nonradicals have employed social-science concepts and have creatively explored important data sources, such as census records,

diaries, voting lists, and tax rolls. Moreover, largely because of radical prodding, historians of diverse political persuasions have begun in the past decade to study systematically both policies and practices and to investigate educational agencies not just in terms of their ideals, but also in terms of their actual impact on the lives they affected. Most, perhaps all, historians have been influenced to some extent by the radicals championing the perspective of the poor and by their sensitivity to institutional bias. But there are significant differences that separate the radical revisionists from other revisionist historians, and these can be traced to the radicals' distinct political and ideological perspective. What characterizes the work of the radical revisionists is their thorough rejection of liberal values and liberal society and their shared belief that schools were consciously designed as undemocratic instruments of manipulation and social control.

II

The major proponents of radical revisionism in this study are a diverse group in many respects. Some are serious scholars while others are shrill polemicists. Their political orientation ranges from Marxist to anarchist, certainly a broad spectrum in terms of programmatic beliefs. Not all are historians by training; two are economists and one is a philosopher of education. There is disagreement in their works on particular issues and individuals. They approach the history of education with different styles and different individual concerns. But their diversity, real though it is, is not so great as their shared outlook. Their work argues that the overall direction of American history has not been towards a more just society, belittles the meliorism of reformers as inadequate or even malevolent, and depicts the school as an institution that coerces far more than it educates.

The works included in this study reflect the spirit of the unusual period in which they were written. Recall that the 1960s opened on a note of exuberance, in contrast to the torpor of the Eisenhower years. During the brief Kennedy administration, a liberal agenda for social reform began to take shape. In the first two years of Lyndon Johnson's tenure, much of the liberal agenda was enacted,

and vast sums were appropriated for new programs. Expectations were high as the president and his advisers spoke of an American commitment to abolish poverty and racism in the foreseeable future.

All too soon, these hopes were dashed--victims of the Vietnam war, urban riots, and persistent economic inequality. The universalism of the early civil rights movement was replaced by the separatism of black nationalists; the idealistic students who worked to enroll black voters in Mississippi in 1964 gave way to idealistic students who employed force and issued nonnegotiable demands for power. American society moved in a remarkably short time from hope to despair and from optimism to bitterness.

Revulsion toward the war and racial injustice was nowhere stronger than on college campuses, where a radical political ideology evolved, which its leaders called the "New Left." Its adherents were passionately committed to the immediate attainment of peace, justice, and equality. The New Left portrayed the American past as a history of racism and exploitation; it scorned the political process as a sham that protected vested interests. In place of the old politics of compromise and conciliation, the New Left favored a new politics of participatory democracy and confrontation tactics.

The New Left ideology was not a refinement or extension of liberal democratic thought but a rejection of it. Participatory democracy was urged in place of representative democracy; confrontation tactics exalted ends over means. The focus of democratic thought in the United States is a commitment to the democratic political process, a belief in the doctrine of majority rule and minority rights. Compromise and conciliation are vital elements in the democratic process, because they are the means by which diverse and competing interests are reconciled peaceably. The process works slowly and unevenly, and it occasionally errs; sometimes the majority is wrong, and sometimes the necessity for conciliation defers needed social change. The major political parties support the process, regardless of who wins elections or legislative votes.

Radicals of left and right perceive the relative lack of conflict in American politics as evidence that there is no real difference between parties and candidates, that the process itself is a charade that changes nothing.

They do not understand that the democratic process is meant to be a mechanism for disagreeing amicably and for arriving at decisions that satisfy the majority without crushing those who differ. The values of stability and civility, on which the democratic system depends, are widely shared because most people know that they may be in the majority on some issues and in the minority on others.⁶

A correlate of the radical left's disavowal of the political system was the belief that American history was composed of legends that justified the status quo. Thus, one could understand events only by looking beneath the surface for purposely obscure patterns, and both Freudian and Marxist analyses provided the intellectual tools for doing so. Whether the "real" reason for some event was psychological or economic, it seemed that things were never what they appeared and that the desire of the people for radical change had been ignored or frustrated. Similarly, where liberals like John Dewey had seen education as an instrument of democratic politics to the extent that it enabled people to participate in shaping the culture and direction of their society, radicals saw it as a vehicle for teaching conformity and complacency.

These intellectual, emotional, and political currents, reflecting an era of radical protest, furnished the climate within which the radical revisionist books were written. None can be said to be a systematic application of New Left thinking to educational history, but all represent different manifestations of the radical perspective of their times. This study will examine works of Michael Katz, Clarence J. Karier, Joel H. Spring, Paul Violas, and Colin Greer as radical revisionists of educational history, as well as those of Walter Feinberg, Samuel Bowles, and Herbert Gintis as nonhistorians who, in different ways, incorporate significant portions of the radical critique in their recent writings. They do not have precisely the same ideological commitment, nor do they all agree in their sense of what is to be done. The anarchism of Spring, for instance, is diametrically opposed to the Marxism of Bowles and Gintis; furthermore, Feinberg, Bowles, and Gintis sharply criticize some of the premises of the historians. But despite their substantial differences, the various authors do share the understanding that American schools have been an intentional, purposeful failure and an integral part of

the larger failure of American society. It is furthermore explicit in these studies that those responsible for this arrangement were not conservatives but liberals, progressives, and reformers.

The essential difference between liberal and radical historians of education was well stated by Marvin Lazerson, an educational historian at the University of British Columbia. The liberals, he writes, describe educational failures as the result of errors, of good intentions gone unpredictably wrong. But the radicals believe

that our educational failures are neither accidental nor mindless, but endemic, built into the system as part of its *raison d'être*. For these historians, schools in America have acted to retain the class structure by molding the less favored to the dominant social order. They are designed to repress blacks and other non-white minorities while enhancing the growth of a professional establishment. These aims, the radical critics and historians believe, have been achieved through the construction of elaborate administrative bureaucracies impervious to reform by parents and students, by the development of ostensibly scientific criteria for selecting out a meritocracy, and by creating an ideology of equality of opportunity that masks the public school's real functions.

Several themes deriving from this perspective appear in the radical histories. First, the school was used by the rich and the middle class as an instrument to manipulate and control the poor and the working class. Second, efforts to extend schooling to greater numbers and to reform the schools were primarily middle-class morality campaigns intended to enhance the coercive power of the school. Third, an essential purpose of the school was to stamp out cultural diversity and to advance homogeneity. Fourth, the idea that upward social mobility might be achieved by children of the poor through schooling was a fable. Fifth, bureaucracy was deliberately selected as the most appropriate structure for perpetuating social

stratification by race, sex, and social class. Sixth, a primary function of schooling was to serve the needs of capitalism by instilling appropriate work habits in future workers. Seventh, those liberals and progressives who tried to make the schools better were serving the interests of the status quo. Lastly, reformers and liberal historians of education have been responsible for the American people's failure to understand the true nature and function of schools.

Refusing to accept any of the usual "givens" in American life and thought, the radicals have subjected American society and its educational institutions to relentless scrutiny. Their works raise important social, political, and economic issues. Their aspirations for equality, freedom, and justice are in keeping with a long and principled tradition of radical protest in American history. Indeed, many of their concerns connect with the earlier work of George Counts and Merle Curti, as well as the larger group of socially and politically conscious educators associated with The Social Frontier magazine during the Depression era. However, the radical historians of the present rarely acknowledge either a connection with or a debt to the reconstructionists of the 1930s, and more often than not criticize their predecessors as having been liberals rather than radicals.¹⁰

Contemporary radical historians have asked provocative and central questions about the social function of the schools, about the antiegalitarian implications of the ideology of equal opportunity, about the relationship between educational institutions and social class, and about the values implicit in any organizational structure. Their works compel the reader to reexamine his or her own premises and to reconsider long-accepted assumptions about the purposes of schooling. Ultimately, as Carl Kaestle, an educational historian at the University of Wisconsin, has pointed out, the great value of the radical critique may be that "its confirmation or rebuttal forces us to look at new questions and new data." This in itself is a powerful contribution to the field. Historians can no longer glibly write of the school as the ladder to opportunity without ascertaining who went to school, how long they stayed, and whether schooling had any discernible impact on their future mobility. Similarly, the radical attack

on such practices as testing, ability grouping, and vocational guidance serves to demonstrate the need for better research into the implementation and effect of these policies. Did they make the schools more efficient? Was efficiency a screen for social segregation? Did they promote the identification of the most able? Is it socially good to promote the identification of the most able? Were the schools more democratic before the introduction of such policies? Are there cities where such policies were not adopted, and if so, what difference did it make; and if not, why not?

Most of the radical historians maintain that they are correcting a false notion spread by traditional or "liberal" historians, who misled the American people into seeing the schools in a positive light. Michael Katz writes:

Americans share a warm and comforting myth about the origins of public education. For the most part historians have helped to perpetuate this essentially noble story, which portrays a rational, enlightened working class, led by idealistic and humanitarian intellectuals, triumphantly wresting public education from a selfish, wealthy elite and from the bigoted proponents of orthodox religion.

Colin Greer writes of a "great school legend," in which "a great nation . . . became great because of its public schools." It is a legend, he holds, created and purveyed by school historians, especially Bernard Bailyn and Lawrence A. Cremin, whom he identifies as apologists for the status quo. The legend, he charges, serves to hide the failure of ethnic and racial minorities to achieve social and economic mobility.

What is ironic in these complaints is that they are actually directed at the self-congratulatory, patriotic tradition associated with Ellwood P. Cubberley, which had already been discredited by Bailyn and Cremin before the first radical history appeared. To debate Cubberley is to risk becoming locked into his limited framework and anachronistic concerns. As Douglas Sloan has cautioned, it would be unfortunate if historians were

simply to stand Cubberley on his head; to retain his moralistic conflict theory of educational change, merely reversing the labels of the children of light and darkness; to substitute for his presentist history, designed to strengthen the public schools, a similarly earnest reform commitment to their demolition; to abandon his faith in the progressive evolution of educational institutions for an equally metaphysical vision of their inevitable degeneration.¹³

Both Cubberley and the radical historians argue a highly partisan interpretation. Where Cubberley saw only the public school's beneficence, they see only its maleficence. Where Cubberley saw it as the symbol of American success, they see it as the symbol of American failure. Like Cubberley, the radicals seek the seeds of the public school in the past, but their aim is to account for the evil that they perceive in the present. They too have a "moralistic conflict theory of educational change," but their antagonists are manipulative reformers and the oppressed poor. But to disprove Cubberley is not to prove his opposite. The proliferation of historical research into education in the past 15 years has established, above all, how numerous are the problems that have not yet been adequately investigated and how elusive is historical certainty.

There are three analytical devices frequently encountered in the radical revisionist works. One is a sort of social and economic determinism, in which conclusions about people, events, and institutions are attributed to the assumed imperatives of social class. While Bowles and Gintis, who are Marxists, are the only authors with a clear-cut class analysis, the others persistently use the concept of social class in a deterministic manner. The second relies on the assumption that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the ultimate effect of a policy and the intentions of its creators. The third is an institutional analysis, articulated by Michael Katz, in which it is suggested that the structure of an institution determines its purposes.

Social class analysis can be a useful tool, particularly when it sets individuals within a known world

and helps to identify their associations, their personal history, and their field of action. Knowing who a person is--his assumptions, his fears, and his hopes--is important, though the historian must take care not to assume that all persons in the same socioeconomic class have identical values, hopes, and fears. The assumption that social origins are a sufficient explanation for a person's actions can lead to fallacious reductionism about causes and effects and can become a substitute for rigorous investigation of the complex political and societal sources of change.

The historian must be constantly mindful of the diversity within social and economic groupings. One need not study history to realize that businessmen are not all on the same side of every political issue, nor are all trade unionists or college professors. People with precisely the same economic self-interest often perceive it in different ways and act on it in different ways.

Social class analysis, when loosely applied, is sometimes simply vacuous generalization that explains very little. John E. Talbott points out that

it has been a common practice . . . to attach a class label to an educational institution, which is then held to respond to "needs" or "demands" of a particular social class. Who determines these needs, or whether, if such needs exist, the institution in fact responds to them, is left unclear. Moreover, such static descriptive statements, based on implicit assumptions about how the class system works, explain very little about the dynamics of the interaction between education and the structure of society. Nor do they allow for the possibility that cultural values and styles of education once presumably moored to a particular social class may drift loose from that class and become the common property of an entire society--in which case they are not particularly amenable to class analysis except in its crudest form. It is hard to see how describing an American university education as "middle class" explains very

much about either the American university or American society. To be sure, education and social class have been and continue to be, intimately connected. But the complexity of the historical connections between them has only begun to receive the carefully nuanced analysis it requires.¹⁴

Class analysis in an American context must always be carefully qualified because of the assumptions on which class analysis is usually based: first, that the United States is composed of distinct and fairly rigid classes; second, that people identify themselves as members of these distinct classes; and third, that people invariably recognize and act consistently with respect to their economic self-interest. If these assumptions were valid, then one could speak authoritatively of the motives and actions of individuals and groups and arrive at historically useful judgments. But there is strong empirical evidence that class analysis is not always appropriate to the American scene because of the overlapping and crosscutting among groups and classes. Contemporary sociologists have found that the overwhelming majority of Americans, regardless of their economic position, think of themselves as middle class. In a society that lacks a widespread sense of class consciousness and class antagonism, class analysis is of limited value. When applied rigorously, it may add some explanatory power to historical interpretation, but the historian must take care not to stress a single dimension of human motivation to the exclusion of all others.¹⁵

The second analytical device used by some radical revisionists (particularly Kariel, Violas, Katz, and Feinberg) permits the historian to assume that the eventual outcome of a policy reveals the intention of the policymaker, so that if a particular policy turns out to be undemocratic in practice, it may be assumed that its original advocates were consciously or unconsciously undemocratic. This interpretation fails to recognize that the consequences of a particular action cannot always be entirely controlled or fully anticipated. Rush Welter, a historian at Bennington College, criticized this line of argument because

on the one hand, this approach leads to the reiterated implication that individual reformers must have sensed that the positions they adopted would serve the interests of the possessing classes. On the other, it presupposes that every individual's activity, no matter what the attitude he took toward educational issues, was part of a larger scheme of oppression and repression geared to the needs of American capitalism. From this point of view, the hopes American educators expressed for improving educational opportunity and disseminating scientific knowledge in a technological age may automatically be perceived as part of a systematic effort to seduce the working class by making them content with their place in the social hierarchy.¹⁶

Conjecture about reformers' motives shifts the burden of proof to the content of reformers' tracts and school officials' speeches. These are far more easily obtained than data about the actual effects of a particular policy. The difficulty is that reformers' statements of purpose are sometimes conflicting, incomplete, inadequately formulated, or unduly optimistic.

Let us take vocational education as an example. Far more is known about the stated intentions of its proponents than about its implementation and effects. Some of its sponsors had a low regard for the intelligence and educability of immigrant children and saw vocationalism as appropriate to the immigrants' necessarily limited life chances; but other sponsors proposed vocational education with the expectation that it would expand opportunity for those children forced to choose between failure in the regular curriculum and dropping out to work as unskilled laborers.

We do not know to what extent vocational education matched the intention of one or the other of its advocates. We do not know enough about what would have happened to the children affected if the vocational program did not exist. We do not know how those children and their parents felt about vocationalism, whether or not they consciously chose it, or to what extent their choice

was directed by school personnel. We need to know more about what happened to vocational students after they left school, what kinds of jobs they got, whether they were trapped in low-level occupations, and whether they achieved more or less mobility than similar children with different school experiences. We need studies of cities that did not offer vocational education, as well as crosscultural research to determine how similar problems were dealt with in other nations, particularly those with different political and economic structures.

A third interpretive device employed in some of the radical works is based on deductions about the relationship between the structure and the purpose of institutions. Analysis of structure is important, especially to those who study the history of schooling, but the historian must avoid the temptation to reduce the complex functioning of a major social institution to simple and deterministic generalizations. The same structure may perform differently at different times, depending on the historical situation. It is necessary to reconstruct particular institutions within the context of their time and to assess the interaction among structure, function, and purpose with the awareness that individuals within given institutions often use them to achieve their own goals regardless of the apparent dictates of structure.

This approach is most often used by radical historians to argue that bureaucracy was purposefully chosen to institutionalize racism and social-class bias in the schools. "Forms of organizational structure are not and cannot be neutral," contends Michael Katz. "The relationships between bureaucracy, class bias, and racism are fixed." The emergence of bureaucracy as the dominant organizational form of public education was neither a historical accident nor an inevitable process, he maintains, but a congruence of purpose and structure: "There is a functional relationship between the way in which schools are organized and what they are supposed to do." American education for the past century has been "universal, tax-supported, free, compulsory, bureaucratic, racist, and class-biased." It might have been different, he believes, if some other form of organization had been chosen:

In fact, on closer inspection, it appears that bureaucracy is inevitable only when men confront certain problems with particular social values and priorities. It is not industrialization that makes bureaucracy inevitable, but the combination of industrialization and particular values.

... Bureaucracy came about because men confronted particular kinds of social problems with particular social purposes. Those purposes reflected class attitudes and class interests. Modern bureaucracy is a bourgeois invention; it represents a crystallization¹⁸ of bourgeois social attitudes.

Katz contends that other, more humane alternatives were available but were ignored or rejected by school reformers since bureaucracy fit their purpose of disciplining children for the industrial order. What were these alternatives? Katz identifies them as "paternalistic voluntarism," "democratic localism," and "corporate voluntarism." The paradigm of "paternalistic voluntarism" was the New York Public School Society, whose self-perpetuating board of trustees sponsored free schooling during the first half of the nineteenth century. As Katz notes, the schools of the Society represented "a class system of education . . . a vehicle for the efforts of one class to civilize another." But the paternalistic voluntarism of the New York Public School Society was not an alternative to bureaucracy; in fact, as Carl Kaestle documents, the New York Public School Society "displayed incipient bureaucracy from the start," and by mid-century "nearly all of the features associated with modern urban school¹⁹ bureaucracies were already evident" in its schools.

Katz's second alternative, "democratic localism," was embodied in the small, locally controlled school district. His first example was an 1841 plan to divide New York City into independent school districts, which was advocated at the time as an alternative to the bureaucratic control of Katz's first model, the New York Public School Society. Katz does not mention that democratic localism was adopted in New York City in 1842²⁰ and that it quickly sprouted into localized bureaucracies.

Katz's third alternative to bureaucracy was "corporate voluntarism," which typified the organization of independent academies and colleges ("individual corporations operated by self-perpetuating boards of trustees and financed either wholly through endowment or through a combination of endowment and tuition"). Though Katz does not dwell on the question of whom these privately endowed, tuition-charging academies and colleges served and whom they excluded, there can be little doubt that corporate voluntarism represented another version of class education--the provision of advanced education by the well-to-do for their own children. Over time, corporate voluntarism evolved the bureaucratic features that are now found in most universities, resulting not from personal whim or class conspiracy but from diverse pressures for fair and uniform treatment of faculty and students.²¹

In sum, Katz's three alternatives were no alternatives at all, for all of them either were or became bureaucratic. Similarly, Katz's assertion that bureaucracy is a "crystallization of bourgeois social values" fails to account for the appearance of bureaucracy in nonbourgeois societies. The fact that bureaucracy is a characteristic organizational form in socialist and Communist nations indicates that it is not a "bourgeois invention" but a complex response to population growth, urbanization, and modernization. While there is abundant historical evidence that cultural chauvinists in the United States wanted to assimilate newcomers, it is unclear just how integral the bureaucratic revolution was to this goal; bureaucratic school systems were also created by some minorities (notably, Catholics) and emerged in culturally homogeneous areas as well.

This blending of class analysis and institutional analysis in Katz's work is supposed to show how class motives dictated certain institutional arrangements. But delving into the motives of those who founded bureaucratic institutions, while it may be significant for social and intellectual historians, is no substitute for careful investigation of the objective conditions that prompted school reformers to look for different ways to organize schools. Nor can it explain the large historical forces at work in different cities, different cultures, and different nations.

One example of this misplaced emphasis is David C. Hammack's interpretation of the centralization and professionalization of New York City's public school system in which the analysis of what happened and why is narrowly tuned to the social-class identity of the centralizers, many of whom were listed in the Social Register. The study minimizes the sorry state of the schools before centralization--the overcrowding, the physical deterioration of buildings, the lockstep instruction, the favoritism in hiring, and the iron grip of a meritless seniority system. By concentrating on the reformers' social origins, the author overlooks the ironic fact that an inflexible bureaucracy had already grown up in the city's schools while they were controlled by powerful local boards, many of which were dominated by ethnic minorities. Also slighted is the interesting process by which an elite managed to convince a popularly elected mayor and state legislature to approve centralization, as well as the way in which the centralized system was taken over by the middle class and the lower middle class when the elite reformers lost political power. No one in the Social Register became a supervisor or teacher in the newly centralized system; the central board had a reform majority for less than three years and was subsequently controlled by Tammany appointees. Instead of giving power over minorities to upper-class nativists, centralization may actually have hastened the dominance of Irish Catholics in the New York City public schools.²²

Another consideration is the possibility that, given the nature of schools at that time, administrative reforms may have been appropriate. In New York City, the centralized system innovated in ways that the decentralized boards never did. For the first time, school officials created programs to serve the entire community, not just those children who signed up before registration closed. Consider the following programs initiated after centralization: classes for the physically handicapped, blind, deaf, tubercular, and anemic; evening recreation centers for teenagers; evening concerts, vacation schools, and playgrounds; medical inspections; high schools; special classes for non-English-speaking children and adults; evening lectures for adults; school libraries. School officials wanted every child to be in some kind of school. Radical historians

like Joel Spring and Colin Greer would say that the schoolmen wanted to enhance their own power and to extend their control over the city's children. But they may be projecting their own values and the perceptions of their own time in an inappropriate way. For one thing, the reforms were popular; millions of people annually attended the lectures, concerts, and recreation centers, voluntarily. But was this merely window dressing for the sinister goings-on in the classrooms? It is not clear that school life was perceived to be as repressive to children and parents of 75 years ago as it now seems to contemporary eyes. Indeed, turn-of-the-century Jewish parents on the lower East Side in New York City nearly rioted when their children were not admitted to public school because of overcrowding, and immigrant parents throughout the city voted out of office a mayor who tried to introduce reforms into their public schools in 1917.²³

A nonradical version of the bureaucratic revolution is found in Selwyn K. Troen's study of the Saint Louis public schools. Troen specifically rejects the idea that bureaucratic reforms were an upper-class power strategy, because "it is mere inference to assert that the presence of social-register types on the board represents a concerted attempt at social control." Why did Saint Louis, like other major American cities, turn to the bureaucratic factory model for its schools? Troen answers, "It was born of necessity as educators first confronted the problems of managing a rapidly expanding and increasingly complex institution." Furthermore, he found that bureaucratization removed the schools from rancorous, divisive politics and that this change won public approval.

In the space of only a generation, public education had left behind a highly regimented and politicized system dedicated to training children in the basic skills of literacy and the special discipline required of urban citizens, and had replaced it with a largely apolitical, more highly organized and efficient structure specifically designed to teach students the many specialized skills demanded in a modern, industrial society. In terms of programs this entailed the introduction of vocational

instruction, a doubling of the period of schooling, and a broader concern for the welfare of urban youth.

The reformed, bureaucratized system was "shaped by the society it was designed to serve." According to Troen, it served the city's needs at that time, and Saint Louisans trusted the system.²⁴

Troen projects himself into the issues of the period and tries to understand them as they were understood at the time. He does not compromise his own sensibility, nor does he chide people of another era for lacking his values and knowledge. The historian is privileged to know not only how things would eventually turn out but also the impact of large social and economic changes. It is easy, with hindsight, to recognize error and shortsightedness. It is more difficult, but no less significant, to document how and why people made certain choices, not only in terms of the limitations imposed by their values and perceptions, but also in terms of the influence of historic forces that they could neither foresee nor control.

III

A central motif of radical history is the assertion that the schools did not foster social and economic mobility. In fact, some of the radicals doubt that there ever was much mobility in American society. They argue that the existence of public schools made it possible to legitimate inequality by appearing to offer equal opportunity to succeed through education. But, they contend, only those from high-status families do well in school, so the injustice of the social order is reproduced and perpetuated through the myth and mechanism of the public school.

Joel Spring maintains that schooling actually curtails social mobility; he claims that "the possibility of movement between social classes has steadily decreased in the United States in the twentieth century with the implementation of universal schooling." Katz views the schools as a ladder of mobility for the middle class but not for the poor because schools were "designed to reflect and confirm the social structure that created them." Colin

Greer contends that the presumed relation between schooling and mobility is "entirely fallacious." Indeed, he writes, "We must not only dismiss the image of rapid mobility and assimilation, but must place, in its stead, an image of a moderately restrictive and fundamentally segregationist society." Bowles and Gintis hold that "education over the years has never been a potent force for economic equality." They state further that the rapid extension of educational attainment has led neither to an increase in economic mobility nor to a diminution of the importance of family background on educational attainment. The school, they find, is "but one of several institutions which serve to perpetuate . . . economic inequality and social immobility." Karier states that "one of the central myths of the twentieth century is that schooling will result in social mobility."²⁵

To test these claims of social immobility and the irrelevance of schooling, it is necessary to examine both historical and contemporary evidence for answers to two separate questions: First, has American society generally been characterized by mobility or immobility, and second, what influence, if any, has schooling had on mobility patterns? If the radical picture is correct, then American society is locked into rigid class patterns which are undisturbed by more or less schooling. But if upward mobility has been widespread, then the radical analysis is a misrepresentation of American history; and if schooling has facilitated upward mobility, then they have misrepresented the social function of schooling.

In recent years, there have been a number of important historical studies that attempt to measure rates of social mobility. A pioneer study of great influence is Stephan Thernstrom's Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City, which examines the career patterns of laborers and their sons in Newburyport, Massachusetts, from 1850 to 1880. He found that while his subjects "experienced a good deal of occupational mobility, only in rare cases was it mobility very far up the social ladder. The occupational structure was fluid to some degree, but the barriers against moving more than one notch upward were fairly high." His conclusion, which suggested that certain "class realities" were more powerful than the rags-to-riches mythology admitted, challenged the popular notion of a wide-open, classless society.²⁶

Since the publication of Thernstrom's study in 1964, other historians have taken issue with what they considered his premature dismissal of American mobility. Studies of Patterson, New Jersey; Poughkeepsie, New York; Omaha; Chicago; Atlanta; and Birmingham have reported more upward mobility for the same period than Thernstrom found in Newburyport. Thernstrom himself has since corrected the impression created by his 1964 work. In an essay published in 1972, he admitted that his "early work--on the laborers in Newburyport--was misleading in its emphasis on the barriers to working class occupational achievement. . . . In other communities . . . the occupational horizon was notably more open." In 1973, he published a study of Boston which further revised his earlier views. In The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis, 1880-1970, Thernstrom writes:

The American class system . . . allowed substantial privilege for the privileged and extensive opportunity for the underprivileged. . . . If Horatio Alger's novels were designed to illustrate the possibility, not of rags-to-riches but of rags-to-respectability, as I take them to have been, they do not offer widely misleading estimates of the prospects open to Americans.

Thomas Kessner, in his 1975 study, The Golden Door: Immigrant Mobility in New York City, 1880-1915, found that there was greater upward mobility in New York City than in any other American city that had been analyzed by other historians. He established mobility rates for Jews and Italians and concluded that "social mobility was both rapid and widespread even for immigrants who came from the peasant towns of southern Italy and the Russian pale." In the decade from 1880 to 1890, the rate of mobility from blue- to white-collar occupations was 22% in Atlanta, 21% in Omaha, and 12% in Boston, averages that included both natives and immigrants. According to Kessner, the Jews and Italians in New York City "who began the decade at the bottom of the Promised City's social order, rose out of the manual class at a rate of 37 per cent in the same decade." While Kessner did not

specifically examine the connection between occupational mobility and schooling, he notes that "Jewish offspring born in America and open to its training and schools did better than their European-born brethren and subsequently moved up the ladder more quickly."²⁸

During the past dozen or so years, historians' use of computers has made it possible to work with large-scale survey data and to investigate social mobility patterns in the distant past. As the technology becomes more sophisticated and as urban historians become more inventive in their application of the technology, the present state of knowledge may be qualified, verified, or reversed altogether. But, pending further research, it does appear that upward social mobility trends have been established in certain American cities during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

However, no such conclusion can be drawn about the role of the school in promoting or hindering upward mobility during the same period. The radical historians have little specific evidence to substantiate their claims about the school's impotence. Katz describes industrial education, the kindergarten, and vocational guidance as innovations that inhibited social mobility by acting as social sorting devices. Industrial education, he writes, instilled "the attitudes and skills appropriate to manual working-class status. Regardless of the rhetoric of its sponsors, industrial education has proved to be an ingenious way of providing universal secondary schooling without disturbing the shape of the social structure and without permitting excessive amounts of social mobility." But he offers no empirical data as to how many children were in an industrial education curriculum, what happened to them subsequently, or whether, in its absence, the same children would have been working in sweatshops. Colin Greer titles one of his chapters "The Assimilation of the Immigrants: The School Didn't Do It." But he is unable to disentangle the influence of the school from other social and economic forces. All that he proves is what was already well known to historians and social scientists: "Some groups did better than others, and some parts of some groups did best of all . . . [and] some groups did less well than others, and some parts of some groups did worst of all." David Tyack, an educational historian at Stanford, reviewed Greer's assertions about the school and wrote, "It appears that only those who make

claims about the positive influences of the public schools have to meet precise scholarly standards of proof."²⁹

The assertions by Katz, Greer, Spring, Karier, and others about the relationship between education and social mobility in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are so far no more than assertions. Historians are presently trying to establish the nature of the relationship, but the data are fragmentary in some ways, voluminous in others, and generally difficult to assemble. Even when school records for individuals are located and compared to census data, tax rolls, and other information, factoring out the precise influence of the schools, as against a host of other unidentified elements, is extremely problematic.

It appears, then, that the present state of historical knowledge points to two conclusions: first, that there has been significant upward mobility in American society in the past; and second, that the relative importance of schooling in this process is thus far uncertain. Popular notions are not very different from these findings. Perhaps the persistence of the American belief in the possibility of upward mobility, of "making it," is due to the remembered family history of middle-class Americans whose own parents or grandparents were poor. The transition from rags-to-shirtsleeves in one, two, or three generations was not uncommon. It is also commonplace to hear this rise in status attributed not just to schooling but to such unmeasurable factors as hard work, determination, and good luck. Further research is needed to clarify the relative influence of schooling, as well as the reciprocal relationship between schooling and social structure.

But whatever conclusions are reached about the past, the objection might reasonably be raised that American society has become less open in the modern period, that the growth of large corporations and the decline of small businesses imply an increasingly rigid class structure whose lines are less easily crossed now than 50 or 100 years ago. Or, as several of the revisionists maintain (agreeing by default with Richard Herrnstein), the signal importance of the school as a stratifying device might actually decrease upward mobility by establishing a meritocracy, a caste system based on intelligence and credentials. And if, as Bowles and Gintis hold, the schools merely reproduce the class structure, then one

would expect to find very little mobility at all between social classes. Bowles and Gintis note that "higher levels of schooling and economic success tend to go together" but insist that the causal linkage is the opposite of what most people think since those who are already economically advantaged get more years of schooling.³⁰

The predominant findings of contemporary sociology do not support these charges. On the contrary, there continues to be a high rate of upward mobility, and formal schooling has been specifically identified as an important factor in this trend.

The most comprehensive study of these issues is Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan's The American Occupational Structure, which reported the results of an inter-generational survey based on a national sample of 20,000 men in 1962. Blau and Duncan found that "there is a large amount of upward mobility in the American occupational structure. Upward movements far exceed downward movements, whether raw numbers, percentages or departures from standardized expectations are considered. . . . Sons from all occupational origins participate in this predominant upward movement."³¹

Education is not irrelevant to mobility, according to Blau and Duncan:

The chances of upward mobility are directly related to education. . . . The proportion of men who experience some upward mobility increases steadily with education from a low of 12 per cent for those reporting no schooling to a high of 76 per cent for those who have gone beyond college. The proportion who have moved up a long distance from their social origins increases in the same regular fashion from under 8 per cent for those with less than five years of schooling to 53 per cent for those with some postgraduate work.³²

Their evidence refutes those who contend that education simply reproduces the existing social order by rewarding those with high family status. They demonstrate statistically that, while family position is associated with education,

of the total or gross effect of education on occupational status in 1962, only a minor part of it consists in a transmission of the prior influence of "family position". . . . Far from serving in the main as a factor perpetuating initial status, education operates primarily to induce variation in occupational status that is independent of initial status.³³

In other words, education has a substantial effect on occupational achievement that is independent of one's social origins.

Comparing social mobility rates of the United States and other industrialized countries, Blau and Duncan found that, in most categories, the United States offered the greatest upward social mobility. Upward movement from the working class into the elite stratum, for instance, was highest in the United States; nearly 10% of sons whose fathers were manual workers moved into the most elite occupations, a higher³⁴ proportion than in any other industrialized country.

Other studies reinforce Blau and Duncan's conclusion that there is "no evidence of 'rigidification'" in terms of social and economic opportunities. A 1964 survey of the social origins of big-business executives showed that entry to the top echelons of American business was more open than at any time in the past. Updating Mabel Newcomer's 1950 analysis of the big-business executive, the 1964 study reported that "only 10.5 percent of the current generation of big-business executives . . . are sons of wealthy families; as recently as 1950 the corresponding figure was 36.1 percent, and at the turn of the century, 45.6 percent."³⁵

Similar conclusions are reached in Christopher Jencks' Inequality. He finds that

there is still an enormous amount of economic mobility from one generation to the next. Indeed, there is nearly as much economic inequality among brothers raised in the same homes as in the general population. This means that inequality is recreated anew in each generation, even among people who start life in essentially identical circumstances.

He notes that "men who get a lot of education are likely to end up in high-status occupations, even if their fathers worked in low-status occupations." Family background is not "the primary determinant of status," since brothers differ in status almost as much as random individuals. On the contrary, he reports that "men with the same amount of education have occupations that are even more alike than men who have the same parents." He holds that "educational attainment is one of the prime determinants of occupational status," though "there are still enormous status differences among people with the same amount of education." One of his findings is that

schooling seems to be important in and of itself, not as a proxy for cognitive skills or family background. Both family background and cognitive skills help a man get through school, but beyond that they have very little direct influence on status. Years of schooling, in contrast, have a substantial influence, even when we compare individuals from identical backgrounds and with identical cognitive skills.³⁶

The importance of educational attainment, he suspects, is due to employers' use of educational credentials as rationing devices for good jobs. His own preference, however, is not for a society with maximum social mobility (or equality of opportunity), but for one where rewards are equal (or equality of results). Schools help people get an equal chance to win unequal rewards. But Jencks wants to reduce inequality, not simply to randomize it; his concern is that even when there is complete equality of opportunity, gross discrepancies of wealth and income remain. As he points out, whether the United States will shift from an ideology of equal opportunity to one of equal results is a political decision, which would be expressed primarily through redistributive tax policies and federal regulation of wages.

Stimulated largely by the work of Jencks and James S. Coleman, a vigorous debate has ensued in the United States about the seemingly contrasting goals of equal opportunity and equal results. Three points seem worth noting: First, equal opportunity, regardless of race, sex, and social class, has not yet been fully achieved;

second, governmental policies already include a combination of both goals; and third, the issue is not whether to equalize incomes but to what degree they will be further equalized.³⁷

It is important to recall that, until very recently, equality of opportunity was no more than a distant, visionary goal. For certain Americans, it has still not been attained. This is a point that radical critics stress, and it is the basis for their charge that the exclusion of certain groups is a systematic, structural defect in American society, which the schools are either partially responsible for or are powerless to change.

No reasonable person can fail to acknowledge the inequities of the past and present and the extraordinary human devastation caused by prejudice and discrimination. But it is also reasonable to seek to ascertain whether there is a trend in correcting the injustices of the past. The important question is not whether there was racism and exploitation in the past, for clearly there was; the question, rather, is whether American society is getting better or worse or remaining the same for those who have been victimized in the past.

Are white ethnic minorities systematically disadvantaged, for example? Blau and Duncan found that "the occupational opportunities of white ethnic minorities on the whole, differ little from those of whites of native parentage." And, they added, parenthetically, "indeed, they are considerably superior to those of southern whites." The difference between these two groups, interestingly, was attributed to the lesser educational attainment of southern whites, which reconfirms the importance of education in occupational achievement. What is more, according to Blau and Duncan, "sons of immigrants who live in the region of their birth tend to achieve an occupational status that is superior to that of comparable natives, not only if they descend from more prestigious, but also if they descend from less prestigious nationalities."³⁸

The fact that discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities existed in the past is important to document, but it is no less important to recognize whether or not the handicaps of the past are being overcome. Andrew Greeley reported recently that the descendants of what formerly were the most disadvantaged white minorities have surpassed the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant groups in

terms of income. The highest average incomes were those of Jews, Irish Catholics, Italian Catholics, German Catholics, and Polish Catholics, in that order. Episcopalians and Presbyterians followed the "new immigrant" groups on the national income ladder.³⁹

But while white minorities may have largely overcome the discrimination of the past, the picture is sharply different for blacks. Blau and Duncan reported that blacks were handicapped "by having poorer parents, less education and inferior early career experiences than whites." And even when these handicaps were statistically controlled, the black man's occupational chances were still consistently inferior to those of whites. Because of racism, blacks suffered "profound inequalities of occupational opportunities." Furthermore, blacks with the same education as whites did not achieve as much occupationally, nor were they likely to be paid the same in equivalent occupations.⁴⁰

Educational investment did not have the same economic return for blacks in 1962 as for whites, except at the highest levels of educational attainment. The difference between white and black income grew with increasing levels of education, except for the most highly educated; the largest income differential was between white and black men who had some college; and the smallest differential was between those whites and blacks with the least education, as well as those whites and blacks with the most education. Blau and Duncan concluded that "the fact that Negroes obtain fewer rewards than the majority group for their educational investments, robbing them of important incentives to incur these costs, may help explain why many Negroes exhibit little interest or motivation in pursuing their education." From this perspective, dropping out of school was economically rational behavior for blacks.⁴¹

These findings were based on data gathered in 1962, before the passage of major civil rights legislation and before the launching of the "Great Society" social programs. Whether or not these initiatives improved the status of black Americans is an important aspect of the radical case against liberal meliorism. Bowles and Gintis state that liberal social policy was "decisively discredited" by its ineffectiveness in the late 1960s. Clarence Karier, finding no diminution in white racism, paints a bleak picture of the prospects for blacks:

With the collapse of desegregation efforts as well as compulsory [sic] education programs, the dangers, for white racists, of an integrated American society passed as blacks were increasingly confined below the poverty level in economically segregated, decaying urban ghettos. Further, with the withdrawal of federal support for urban schools and the consequent deterioration of these schools as educational institutions, the future for black youth was sealed.⁴²

While Karier maintains that "all history is written from a perspective that is invariably shaped out of one's existential present," and that "each researcher's ideology determines his approach to the data," still there are some factual questions that can be resolved regardless of the researcher's ideology. How one appraises John Dewey's philosophy is a matter of opinion, but whether or not compensatory programs were "drastically reduced," as Karier elsewhere claims, is a matter of fact. The major federal compensatory program, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, received approximately \$1.05 billion in 1967; the same program was funded at \$1.5 billion in 1973 and 1974, and at \$1.9 billion in 1975. Whether or not these funds were apportioned well or spent well are separate issues; the point is that the amount appropriated by the federal government was not "drastically reduced."⁴³

Are blacks "increasingly confined below the poverty level in economically segregated, decaying urban ghettos?" According to the Census Bureau, 58.3% of American blacks were living in central cities in 1974. This represented a significant increase over 1960, when about 52% of blacks lived in central cities. Some of this growth reflects natural increase, and some is due to an inflow of population from rural areas to cities during the 1960s. The implications of this concentration are mixed, and not altogether negative. It suggests, for instance, that blacks will be able to forge a base of political power in the cities. Clusters of black voters elect black mayors, congressmen, and state legislators. From 1971 to 1975, the total number of black elected officials in the nation nearly doubled, from 1,860 to 3,503; of 135 black mayors, 11 were elected in large metropolitan cities.

Political power means control over jobs, contracts, and policies, as well as better articulation of black interests.⁴⁴

During the period from 1970 to 1974, black population growth in the central cities slowed to the level of natural increase; additionally, there was both a black immigration to the South and an increase by nearly 20% of the black suburban population. While blacks are now only 5% of the suburban population, the likeliest way to enlarge this proportion is through such liberal social policies as fair housing legislation, court action against restrictive zoning codes, and housing subsidies. Governmental policies can be shaped to encourage and preserve integrated neighborhoods, just as they have been used in the past for the opposite purpose. But building political consensus for liberal social policy among the electorate requires both a belief in the efficacy of such policies⁴⁵ and a commitment to the democratic political process.⁴⁵

Recent national census studies indicate that the liberal social policies of the Johnson Administration had a significant positive effect. In 1964, approximately half of all American blacks were below the poverty line; by 1974, the proportion had dropped to 31.4%. The most rapid decline in the number of poor blacks occurred during the late 1960s, a time when liberal social policies were implemented. During the period from 1964 to 1974, the proportion of black families earning over \$15,000 annually grew from 9% to 19%; the period of fastest gain was from 1965 to 1970.⁴⁶

The overall income gap between blacks and whites remains large, though it has narrowed somewhat. Black family income in 1974 was only 58% of white family income, compared to 54% in 1964. But poverty was not randomly spread among blacks. Young black families in the North and West, those in which both spouses were employed, had incomes that were 99% of the income of equivalent white families; even in the South, where black earnings were lowest, these families earned 87% of the income of corresponding white families. Black poverty was increasingly concentrated among female-headed families, which were two-thirds of all poor black families by 1974.⁴⁷

The composite picture of social and economic trends for the past 15 years does not support the radical claim

that liberal social policy has been discredited. On the contrary, it appears to validate the effectiveness of a many-pronged attack on poverty and inequality, beginning with stringent civil rights laws and including governmental action on jobs, education, and housing. Some of the programs were failures, the victims of poor planning or poor execution. But in the relatively brief period during which the Johnson domestic programs enjoyed strong funding and political support, their impact on poverty was significant. Similarly, certain Title I compensatory education programs produced measurable gains for disadvantaged children. As Ralph Tyler has noted, the widespread contrary impression--that better schooling can't make a difference--was based on the Coleman report and Christopher Jencks's *Inequality*, but in fact, neither study measured educational progress⁴⁸ after the federal legislation of 1965 became operative.

As a result of the gains of the 1960s, those blacks who are under 35, well educated, and middle class have achieved virtually full economic equality with their white peers. What this means is not simply economic benefit for this group alone; it means that, for the first time in American history, blacks can achieve equality through some of the same mechanisms that other groups have used and from which blacks have previously been excluded. Schooling is one of those mechanisms, and its importance has grown as the American economy has become more complex and technical. For the first time, black investment in education is worth making. Just as dropping out was once an economically rational decision, getting more education is now as rational for blacks as it has been for whites.

Young blacks seem to have recognized this, despite a spate of articles and books about the irrelevance of schooling, for they are staying in school longer than at any time in the past. Identical proportions of blacks and whites are enrolled in school until the age of 20. From 1964 to 1975, the proportion of blacks increased from 5% to 10% of all college students. In the fall of 1974, 12.3% of all college freshmen were black (blacks were then 11.4% of the total population and 12% of all college-age persons). The black-white enrollment gap has steadily narrowed during the past decade. In 1964, 10.3% of all blacks between 18 and 24 were in college, compared to 25.5% of whites. By 1975, 20.7% of blacks in this age group were in college, compared to 26.9% of whites. Black

college enrollment reached 948,000 in 1975, a 246% increase in a decade (the white increase was 60%). Additionally, an identical 17% of both white and black families below the poverty line reported at least one family member in college.⁴⁹

Confirmation of the relationship between schooling and occupational achievement has come from Robert M. Hauser and David L. Featherman, sociologists at the University of Wisconsin who recently completed the first systematic replication of the Blau and Duncan study of the American occupational structure. Using 1973 data provided by the Census Bureau, Hauser and Featherman were once again able to chart occupational changes across generations of American men. They found that upward mobility continued to be high (in 1973, 49% were upwardly mobile and 19% were downwardly mobile, almost precisely the same as the 1962 figures); that the mobility table for black men was more like that of all men than it had been a decade earlier; that the length of schooling had an increasingly powerful effect on a man's occupational standing; that occupational returns to schooling were increasing, especially among blacks; that blacks had gained significantly in occupational status since 1962; and that 60% of this gain was explained by 50 levels of schooling attained by blacks by 1973.

Assessing the implications of these findings, Featherman holds, first, that

the family and the school both are important sources of the socioeconomic achievements of men (and women) in modern America. Families provide cultural, intellectual, social and economic resources for achievement. The schools refine these resources and convert them into marketable skills and knowledge. But of the two, schooling is the greater source of variation in socioeconomic achievement, since one of the ways that the family and social origins in general affect achievement is through the schools. . . . [Second] a large component of the occupational achievement of men has nothing to do with social background or schooling. Success is not guaranteed by education, and humble origins do not preclude it. The

third implication is that schooling is today an effective mechanism by which individuals can augment their stations in life and improve their standing⁵¹ relative to their own socioeconomic origins.

The school performs two complementary functions, according to Featherman. On one hand, it reproduces the class system from generation to generation, since students from high-status families stay in school longer and thereby get high-status jobs. But its second function, which is far stronger and more effective than the first, is to sponsor the advancement of the most able regardless of their social origins. Citing William H. Sewell's longitudinal studies of 10,000 high school students in Wisconsin, Featherman notes that Sewell found "only 18 percent of all the educational differences in his sample to be associated with social class factors per se." Based on these and other studies, Featherman concludes that "it is impossible to support the claim that the process of schooling in modern America inherently and consistently reproduces the social class system."⁵²

Hauser and Featherman's research shows that there is still a sizable gap between white and black occupational achievement, but it also reveals that there has been a significant narrowing of this gap during the past decade. It is important to recognize, as sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset has observed, that the considerable advances of younger and better educated blacks "did not happen as a result of the 'natural' operation of sociological and economic factors, as had occurred earlier with various white ethnic groups. In the case of blacks, discrimination had to be countered by political forces." Political action by executive agencies, the Congress, the judiciary, and civil rights organizations was not ineffective, nor has liberal social policy been "decisively discredited," as Bowles and Gintis charge. It is indisputable that full equality has not been achieved, but equally indisputable in the light of the evidence is the conclusion that a democratic society can bring about effective social change, if there are both the leadership and the political commitment to do so. To argue, against the evidence, that meaningful change is not possible is to sap the⁵³ political will that is necessary to effect change.

IV

The first major radical revisionist work, Michael Katz's The Irony of Early School Reform, was published in 1968. It has been the most influential, in part because it broke new ground by introducing the radical perspective to educational history, but also because it is a well-written, sophisticated effort to apply social science concepts to historical problems. Because of its originality and its impact on subsequent scholarship, it has been one of the most significant books in its field during the past decade. Katz is a Harvard-trained historian who is now at York University in Toronto.

The central theme of The Irony of Early School Reform is Katz's interpretation of the reasons for educational reform in the nineteenth century; they were not, he writes, a "potpourri of democracy, rationalism, and humanitarianism. They were the attempt of a coalition of the social leaders, status-anxious parents, and status-hungry educators to impose educational innovation, each for their own reasons, upon a reluctant community." He argues that the irony of mid-nineteenth-century school reform is that it was not the product of working-class demands, but rather that it was imposed on an unwilling and skeptical working-class community by zealous social leaders. Consequently the working class became estranged from the school, which was perceived as an alien institution, and this estrangement "has persisted to become one of the greatest challenges to reformers of our own time."⁵⁴

In a series of interrelated essays, Katz imaginatively explores the ramifications of educational reform and the ideology of educational reformers in nineteenth century Massachusetts. He ranges easily across a wide field of disparate data, weaving facts and ideas into a coherent interpretation. He portrays reformers as middle-class and upper-class men with a clear sense of moral superiority and little hesitation in imposing their values on others. He suggests, too, their confusion and ambivalence as they tried to sort out the causes and effects of crime, vice, and poverty. A typically valuable insight is his observation that reformers advocated high schools both to promote industrialization and to cure its evil effects; by their activity, they contributed to the disintegration of the sense of community that they so

vehemently espoused. His essay on the assumptions that led to the establishment of a state reform school for juvenile delinquents is a creative work of scholarship.

Frequently, his insights are more powerful than his analyses. When he examines the sources of professionalization, for example, his description of what happened is far more compelling than his explanations of why it happened. As educators became self-consciously professional, he holds, they turned inward and built a narrow world of their own; shielded by their self-righteous, salvationist, reformist rhetoric, they lost the capacity either to accept criticism or to criticize themselves. In explaining why he thinks this happened, he reconstructs a conflict between "soft-line" educators and "hard-line" educators. The soft-liners were reformers who believed in the importance of environment over heredity and in teaching through an appeal to the child's interest rather than obedience to authority; they "stressed the very qualities most necessary for social mobility and economic success," which meant self-discipline, inner motivation, and a refusal to accept the status quo as necessary. The hard-line educators held a Calvinistic, pessimistic, and conservative approach to such problems as crime, insanity, and education; they believed that man's inherent nature limited the possibility of change. The soft-liners considered the hard-liners to be harsh, authoritarian, and inflexible. Katz contends that the decisive victory of the soft-line over the hard-line "was a major defeat for the quality of American education," because it "marked the ending of serious educational debate." The soft-liners' triumph, he holds, was the result of an "almost brutal exercise of power" by Horace Mann and his allies.⁵⁵

Katz's explanation raises more questions than it answers, largely because of his inadequate concern with the political process, the means by which educational policy decisions were made and changed. Why were the advocates of the hard line unable to resurrect their views by appealing to the electorate, the community at large? Why were spokesmen for the hard line unable to turn supporters of the soft line in the state legislature out of office? Katz does not inform his readers whether they tried to do so. Mann's soft-line supporters in Boston ran for the school committee and got elected (Katz characterizes their election as "a takeover"); he notes

that the soft-liners were not a majority on the school committee, and it is not clear why "their impact was strong," strong enough to cause a purge of the hard-line, conservative schoolmasters. Nor is it evident from Katz's account how the "brutal and vindictive" tactics of soft-line reformers in Massachusetts could account for the erosion of the hard line in American education generally.⁵⁶

Somewhat contradictorily, Katz states at the end of The Irony that the hard line, expressed as a belief in the importance of heredity over environment, has reappeared at the end of each soft-line, reform cycle. But is this apparently cyclical alternation of hard-line (hereditarian) and soft-line (environmentalist) ideology a "serious educational debate"? Should the articulation of both views be encouraged for the sake of a good debate and would such a debate improve the quality of American education? Apparently not, for he concludes that the hard-line should be seen as a threat to reform aspirations, a "rationalization for failure, an excuse for some relaxation of effort," thus allying himself with the soft-line reformers whom he has criticized throughout the book.⁵⁷

The first portion of The Irony of Early School Reform is devoted to the analysis of a vote cast in Beverly, Massachusetts, in 1860, in which the townspeople abolished their two-year-old high school. The Beverly case is the most significant section of the book because it supplies the evidence for Katz's belief in "reform by imposition." Katz studied voter lists and tax rolls and concluded that the wealthy and the middle class supported the high school, while the working class voted against it. He holds that the promoters of the high school knew that the poor could not afford to dispense with their children's earnings and that they intended to spread "throughout the whole community the burden of educating a small minority of its children." The workers, he speculates, perceived the high school as a symbol of the industrialization that was destroying their independence and reducing their status; a vote against the high school was a vote against the advocates of industrial and economic development. He points out that the heaviest vote against the high school came from shoemakers, who at that very time were on strike because of a cut in their wages.⁵⁸

The trouble with Katz's basic argument is that it violates the principle of Occam's razor: It suggests a complicated, inferential explanation where a far simpler one is sufficient to the data. As Katz notes, 56% of all those who voted against the high school had no school-age children, which was reason enough to object to a school tax. In addition, a majority of the opponents lived in sparsely populated, outlying districts, farthest from the high school. Either of these facts would explain the vote to abolish the school, as an expression of the nay-voters' self-interest.

Nor is Katz's interpretation strongly supported by his data. The commitment of the wealthy and the middle class to the high school is not as pronounced in his tabulations as it is in the body of the text. He writes that "a significant majority" of Beverly's "businessmen" supported the high school. Actually, the businessmen were almost evenly divided, with 30 in favor and 28 against the school. Of the 30 in favor, 4 were "business employees," who were probably clerks. If their vote is subtracted (because they were workers rather than businessmen), then the business vote was against the high school, 28 to 26, and a key element in Katz's argument is reversed. This weakness is even more evident in comparing the votes cast by "proprietors of business," who were 4-to-1 against the high school, to the votes of the "business employees," who favored the high school 4 to 0. These small numbers certainly have no statistical significance so far as American educational history is concerned, but within the scope of Katz's book they do not support the argument built on them.⁵⁹

The shoemakers, who were then on strike, voted heavily against the high school, 80 to 29. Katz interprets their vote as "an opportunity to vent their anger in a perfectly legal way." But, oddly, his appendix reveals that their employers, the shoe manufacturers, also voted to abolish the high school, by a vote of 9 to 5. What seems as likely an explanation as Katz's is that the shoemakers were economically depressed by their recent cut in wages, as well as by loss of income during the strike, and were voting to reduce their taxes.⁶⁰

Katz's opinion that school reform was exploitative is not fully sustained by his evidence. Neither the well-to-do nor the working class was monolithic in its vote. By finding that the high school was favored more by

the well-to-do than by the workers, Katz proves the obvious: that the higher a family is on the socioeconomic scale, the more it values education, the more it will spend on its children's education, and the longer its children will stay in school. He interprets this as an effort by the privileged to educate their children at the expense of the entire community, but nearly half of those who supported the high school did not have school-age children. Besides, his implication that tax funds should be spent only on services used by each segment of the community in proportion to its number is a narrow and regressive concept of public welfare; on that theory, government should not support public housing, public universities, public hospitals, public libraries, or any other good consumed disproportionately by any one segment of the community. Additionally, his view assumes that the poor and the working class are entitled to act on their self-interest, but that the well-to-do and the middle class are not.

Katz's historiographical argument is a debate with a straw man. "Older historians," he writes, identified "two distinct clusters of antagonists . . . : prominent, prestigious leaders and a working class. But the antagonists' attitudes defined by older historians must be reversed: the Beverly experience reveals that one dynamic of educational controversy was the attempt of social leaders to impose innovation upon a reluctant working class." His representation of the standard historiographical interpretation is not entirely accurate. Excepting Alice Felt Tyler, the standard works portray the advocates of schooling as a coalition of diverse social and economic groups, each with its own interests. Even Cuddeberly had a list of public school proponents that included not only "the intelligent workingmen in the cities," but seven other categories, such as "Citizens of the Republic," "philanthropists, and humanitarians," "public men of large vision," and "city residents." Cremin noted that both liberals and conservatives converged on the idea of a common school, for different reasons. Sidney Jackson and Merle Curti stressed the contradictory appeal of the public school both to those who wanted to maintain the status quo and to those who hoped to change it. This notion that the public school was extended by a coalition of disparate elements is actually sustained by Katz's data on Beverly, where nearly 25% of the vote for

the high school came from workers, while another 28% came from men who were neither social leaders nor promoters of industrialism.⁶¹

What is missing in Katz's Beverly account is an appraisal of the politics of the town and the way in which it interacted with the politics of the school. We learn little of the political struggle that must have accompanied the establishment of the high school in 1858. We are told that there was an annual town meeting, but we do not learn how the town was governed or whether the anti-school majority controlled the political structure. Katz holds that "on the local level partisan politics was simply irrelevant" to educational reform, but he does not provide enough specific information to substantiate his judgment. There is no mention of whether the imminent Civil War had any bearing on the town's willingness to support a high school. It would have been interesting to know which citizens stayed silent when the high school's fate was voted on (were the abstainers workers, businessmen, or social leaders?). While Katz carefully details the history and social background of leading high school promoters, Joseph Thissell, who introduced the motion to abolish the high school, is never further identified. The reader quite naturally wonders what happened after the vote to disestablish the high school, how the community reacted, when a high school was reestablished, whether a new vote was taken, and which social groups supported or opposed the high school when it was re-created.⁶²

In the concluding sentences of The Irony of Early School Reform, Katz writes:

We must face the painful fact that this country has never, on any large scale, known vital urban schools, ones which embrace and are embraced by the mass of the community, which formulate their goals in terms of the joy of the individual instead of the fear of social dynamite or the imperatives of economic growth. We must realize that we have no models; truly ⁶³ to reform we must conceive and build anew.

The dilemma in Katz's formulation is his assumption that "the mass of the community" wants schools that stress "the

joy of the individual" rather than discipline or economic betterment. Throughout the book, as well as in most of Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools, he assumes that the goals of educational radicals and working-class parents are the same. Only in the last chapter of the latter book does he acknowledge that the goals of the two groups may be quite dissimilar. He recounts a story of how educational radicals worked to elect a poor mother to a city school board without knowing her opinions on school issues; much to the radicals' surprise, they learned toward the end of the campaign that their candidate favored report cards and corporal punishment and opposed sex education. Katz reflected:

I suspect that what the poor want for their children is affluence, status, and a house in the suburbs rather than community, a guitar, and soul. They may prefer schools that teach their children to read and write and cipher rather than to feel and to be. If this is the case, then an uncomfortable piece of reality must be confronted: Educational radicalism is itself a species of class activity. It reflects an attempt at cultural imposition fully as much as the traditional educational emphasis on competition, restraint, and orderliness, whose bourgeois bias radicals are quick to excoriate.⁶⁴

But this is a remarkable reversal of the thrust of both of Katz's books. If the working class and the poor want their children to have a traditional education, to learn self-discipline, and to gain economic benefits from schooling, then their goals are not very different from those of the liberal, middle-class reformers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If this is so, then the "estrangement" between the working class and the school is either nonexistent or occurs only as the school abandons its "bourgeois" direction.

This is a profound dilemma, and few of the other radicals even consider it. Most take it for granted that "the people" want what educational radicals want for them, that participatory democracy in school policy will lead to joyful schools or even to the disestablishment of formal

schools. The irony, perhaps, is that participatory democracy may facilitate the restoration of educational policies that radicals (and liberals) consider repressive and inhumane.

Politically, Katz's version of the radical analysis is curiously anti-activist, because of its characterization of reform as coercive social control. This radical critique, with its suspiciousness of reformers and of state action generally (since state action involves one small group of people--those in power--making laws for others--those not in power), is entirely consistent with an anarchist outlook, but it implies a reactionary approach to social policy. Anyone who wants to better society is advised by this ideology to sit back and wait for indigenous change; Katz argues that educational change might have been more successful if it had been "more slowly paced," if it had "come through community action," rather than having been imposed by impatient reformers. One would certainly not want to risk becoming an overzealous reformer, forcing one's views against the will of the majority. This position, based on the overriding value of participatory democracy, puts the educational radical at odds with the mainstream of liberalism, which makes heroes of dissenters, crusaders, and reformers, especially those who are willing to become, like Ibsen's Dr. Stockmann, "An enemy of the people." And it creates no way to deal with those situations where the will of the community is unjust and exploitative.

V

The frontal attack on the liberal tradition is exemplified in Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century, a collection of essays by Clarence J. Karier, Paul Violas, and Joel Spring. At the time of its publication in 1973, Karier and Violas were educational historians at the University of Illinois, and Spring was an educational historian at Case Western Reserve University. The authors stress that their version of history is directly opposed to that of liberal historians like Merle Curti, Henry Steele Commager, Richard Hofstadter, and Lawrence A. Cremin, whom they categorize as apologists for the military-industrial, corporate-liberal state. The liberal historians are

described as pragmatic humanitarians who believe in progress, social meliorism, and the "intelligent use of science and technology" to achieve a better life for mankind. Most people would consider that a flattering description, but the authors contend that the optimism of the liberals made them incapable of seeing "that this society is in fact racist, fundamentally materialistic, and institutionally structured to protect vested interests" and that the school "was in fact a vehicle of control and repression."⁶⁵

The authors' idea of how history is written defines their methodology. As they explain in their introduction, how one interprets history is a function of how one views the present, and history is merely an extension of the historian's ideology. Their essays demonstrate repeatedly the dangers of a moralistic, presentist approach in which the authors scour the past for events and quotes to buttress their own political views. Since the authors believe that all "facts" are conditioned by one's value judgments, they have free rein to argue polemically, with scant concern for questions of significance and context. Jane Addams is judged not by what she did but by a present-minded analysis of what she wrote; John Dewey is judged by isolated quotations from his writings, with little effort to demonstrate whether the offending essay or paragraph or sentence was representative of his thought or how⁶⁷ it actually affected educational and social policy.

Most of the essays in Roots of Crisis focus on the leading figures and trends of the progressive era, when the school was transformed into the primary agency of "social control." Cremin had seen the progressive thrust in education "as part of a vast humanitarian effort to apply the promise of American life," but Karier, Violas, and Spring see it as the rationalization of a coercive, repressive "corporate liberal state." Not humanistic concern, but testing, sorting, racism, and social stratification were the essential elements in progressive reform, according to the authors of Roots of Crisis. As Carl F. Kaestle has observed, a problem in analyzing "progressive education, if the phrase is taken to mean all educational innovation from 1890 through the 1920s, is the bewildering variety of programs and philosophies. The liberating, conformist, individualizing, and bureaucratizing tendencies set loose in these years make almost

any interpretation possible⁶⁸ if you look at the right group of people and statements.

Instead of trying to create a sense of this "bewildering variety," of people working at cross-purposes, of arguments and uncertainty over ends and means, Karier, Violas, and Spring reduce the era to a monochrome, in which the leading figures are relentlessly bent on achieving control, stability, order, and efficiency. The generous and warm impulses that others have attributed to settlement-house workers and social reformers are denied and in their stead is seen only the desire to repress and homogenize any source of dissidence in the society. Those who seemed to be helping the needy were only pacifying them and neutralizing their discontent. In the radical perspective, the dominant trend of the progressive period was not to improve schools and society, but to preserve social order while processing workers for industry. What once seemed remarkably complex becomes remarkably simple, as progressives and their contemporary opponents are melded into a single body of opinion with a complementary, coercive program and ideology.

The arguments made in these essays are for the most part too one-sided to deal adequately with the issues that are raised. We need to know more about the interrelationships among the various political and social movements of the progressive period. It was, after all, a period of enthusiasms, which included not only school reform, but such diverse causes as municipal beautification, prohibition, women's suffrage, eugenics, and immigration restriction. Were all of these different expressions of the same desire to perfect American society? Did they reach different audiences? Did their leaders argue with one another? How did radicals and progressives perceive one another? As with other complicated historical problems, the consideration of the cross-currents of the progressive era requires an open mind and an appreciation for subtlety and nuance.

Clarence J. Karier portrays liberals like Jane Addams and John Dewey as manipulative, middle-class builders of a "compulsory state," in which "nonviolent but coercive means" would be used to shape and control people; these "state-welfare" liberals aimed to Americanize immigrants, who were potential threats to the social order. Karier's chief target is John Dewey, whom he sees as a pillar of

the establishment and a salesman of the emerging corporate order. He claims that Dewey was an assimilationist who "viewed ethnic and religious differences as a threat to the survival of society." Karier's major evidence for this charge is a confidential report on conditions among Polish-Americans that Dewey submitted to the federal government in 1918. Karier considers the report to be proof that Dewey "was mainly concerned with the manipulation of Polish affairs so that we would not lose our cheap immigrant labor supply after the war." Walter Feinberg, in his book *Reason and Rhetoric*, discusses this same study at length as evidence that Dewey was identified with "American military and commercial interests" and was undemocratically committed to assimilating the Polish.⁶⁹

Karier's and Feinberg's interpretations of Dewey's Polish study have been challenged by Charles L. Zerby, who contends that they did not understand the historical situation in which the report was prepared. Zerby describes a factional struggle within the Polish-American community over the direction of postwar American policy towards Poland. One faction, which was composed of anti-Semitic, conservative monarchists, had achieved considerable access to the Wilson administration; the other, largely radicals and socialists, had not been able to make its case in Washington. Dewey's report urged the federal government to give the excluded faction a fair hearing. Ignoring Dewey's plea, the Wilson administration gave official recognition to the conservative group. Seen in this political context, the Polish report was not a refutation of Dewey's democratic principles, but a reaffirmation of those principles. Similarly, J. Christopher Eisele has maintained that the radical interpretation of Dewey's views on immigrants and assimilation has been "inaccurate and misleading; that Dewey was not attempting to homogenize ethnic differences or destroy ethnic culture; to the contrary, he favored the preservation of cultural differences and ethnic variables." Like Zerby, Eisele finds that the attack on Dewey has been pieced together from isolated quotations, divorced from their historical context.⁷⁰

The risk in using history to make a political point relevant to the present is that the historical materials may be shaken loose from their original context. An egregious example of tailoring quotes to fit the writer's ideology is Paul Violas's essay on Jane Addams. The words

he quotes are hers, but in repeated instances, the context and meaning have been altered to match his point, not hers. His selections from her works are meant to demonstrate Violas's belief that Addams sacrificed individualism for the sake of a unified, organic society. Her overriding commitment to a "new ideal community," he claims, brought her to reject the ties of family, social class, ethnicity, and nationality. He writes: "The immigrant, for Jane Addams, presented a threat because his different ethnic background disrupted American cultural unity. The relative ease, however, with which he could be stripped of his cultural foundations and reduced to the simplest common elements of humanity enhanced his value as a building block for her new community."¹

Probably nothing less than a synoptic presentation of Violas's selections, alongside Addams's actual prose in its full context, could reveal the extent to which he has misconstrued the spirit of her words. He says, for instance, that "She rejected the family as a primary object of loyalty. Filial loyalty was too narrow and selfish: 'Our democracy is making in-roads upon the family, the oldest of human institutions, and a claim is being advanced which in a certain sense is larger than the family claim'." In its context, the meaning of her sentence is unrelated to Violas's point. Addams, in Democracy and Social Ethics, was writing specifically about the dilemma of the educated woman in 1902, torn between those who tell her that her only role is to raise a family and her own desire to serve in some social role outside the family. She wrote:

The collision of interests, each of which has a real moral basis and a right to its own place in life, is bound to be more or less tragic. It is the struggle between two claims, the destruction of either of which would bring ruin to the ethical life. . . . The failure to recognize the social claim as legitimate causes the trouble; the suspicion constantly remains that woman's public efforts are merely selfish and capricious, and are not directed to the general good.

She argued that the two claims should be adjusted so that

"neither shall lose and both be ennobled." Rather than urging the atomization of the individual and the destruction of the family, as Violas suggests, Addams was asserting the right of women like herself to become actively engaged in the world, to participate in "that life which surrounds and completes the individual and family life."²

The footnote in Violas's essay which is supposed to document Addams's rejection of ethnic groups as a basis of identity refers to a page on which there is no mention of ethnicity; however, on the pages immediately following are Addams's views about how the Russian immigrants' idealism and insatiable desire for justice "might be utilized to a modification of our general culture and point of view, somewhat as the influence of the young Germans who came to America in the early fifties, bringing with them the hopes and aspirations embodied in the revolutions of 1848, made a profound impression upon the social and political institutions of America." Her point seems to be the opposite of the one Violas attributes to her. The entire corpus of her work rebuts Violas's contention that she wanted to strip the immigrants of their ethnic and cultural identity. Throughout her written works, as well as her life work, she consistently encouraged the preservation of immigrant traditions. In The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets, she wrote enthusiastically about the beauty of the folkways of America's many minorities, which she described as "an enormous reserve of material for public recreation and street festival." In a typical passage, she wrote:

Were American cities really eager for municipal art, they would cherish as genuine beginnings the tarantella danced so interminably at Italian weddings; the primitive Greek pipe played throughout the summer nights; the Bohemian theatres crowded with eager Slavophiles; the Hungarian musicians strolling from street to street; the fervid oratory of the young Russian preaching social righteousness in the open square.

In Newer Ideals of Peace, she wrote:

In our refusal to face the situation, we have persistently ignored the political ideals of the Celtic, Germans, Latin, and Slavic immigrants who have successively come to us; and in our overwhelming ambition to remain Anglo-Saxon, we have fallen into the Anglo-Saxon temptation of governing all peoples by one standard. We have failed to work out a democratic government which should include the experiences and hopes of all the varied peoples among us.

Violas claims that Addams "proposed to teach the worker that even when his situation was desperate, industrial conflict was not necessary." This is a substantive distortion of both what she wrote and what she meant. Addams expressed the wish that strikes could proceed without violence because she believed that violence turns public opinion against the workers. She wrote:

If the element of battle, of mere self-seeking, could be eliminated from strikes, if they could remain a sheer uprising of the oppressed and underpaid to a self-conscious recognition of their condition, so unified, so irresistible as to sweep all the needy within its flood, we should have a tide rising, not to destruction, but to beneficence. Let us imagine the state of public feeling if there had been absolutely no act of violence traceable, directly or indirectly, to the union miners; if during the long months of the strike the great body of miners could have added the sanction of sustained conduct to their creed. Public sympathy would have led to an understanding of the need these miners were trying to meet, and the American nation itself might have been ready to ask for legislation concerning the minimum wage, and for protection to life and limb. . . . But because the element of warfare unhappily did exist, government got back to its old business of repression.

Clearly, it was not industrial conflict that she opposed, but violence. She not only opposed violence on principle, but because she believed that it hurt the workers' cause. While her pacificism may have been naive, it was sincere and not just a tactic to disarm the proletariat.

Perhaps Violas's most outrageous fabrication is his suggestion that Addams presaged fascism, that her "concept of social control through mass psychology carried inherent implications for manipulation of the masses." His evidence for this charge is drawn from an essay in The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets where she was arguing against the commercialization of pleasure and in favor of better provision for public recreation. In place of commercial theaters, where young people were passively entertained, she advocated public games, choral groups, folk dancing, and other joyful activities that involved active participation. Addams described the great appeal of baseball thus: "The enormous crowd of cheering men and boys are talkative, good-natured, full of the holiday spirit, and absolutely released from the grind of life. . . . Does not this contain a suggestion of the undoubted power of public recreation to bring together all classes of a community in the modern city unhappily so full of devices for keeping men apart?" She wrote approvingly of "the festival, the street procession, the band of marching musicians, orchestral music in public squares or parks, with the magic power they all possess to formulate the sense of companionship and solidarity." Reacting to these lines, Violas solemnly comments:

This echo of enormous crowds of cheering men, martial music, parades . . . the expression of emotions through symbols, and the fusion of individual voices into a collective expression of solidarity reverberates through the charred corridors of the twentieth century with deafening resonance. A resonance which, of course, Miss Addams could not have anticipated.

This suggestion that Jane Addams's forthright appeal for more parks, more gymnasias, more sports and games and street music was an expression of incipient totalitarianism is simply incredible.

VI

Karier's Shaping the American Educational State is yet another sounding board for the radical critique. His selection of readings and his introductions to them are intended to support his thesis that American educators have been unwittingly racist and that the system they created was designed to protect "the vested interests of the favored classes." The essays have been chosen to make Karier's point, rather than to explore any of the issues in depth. As he surveys American educators and their debates, conservatives, liberals, progressives, and reactionaries merge--all racists, all servants of power. This blurring of distinctions makes it possible for him to refer to Arthur Jensen⁶ and William Shockley as "liberals," without explanation.

The two issues that concern him most are academic freedom and testing as examples of liberal failure. The usefulness of the book is diminished by its one-sided interpretations and by the partiality of its evidence. For example, Karier's omission of John Dewey's New Republic articles on testing is striking. They cannot have been unknown to Karier, because they appeared immediately after the six articles by Walter Lippman which are included in the collection. The only conceivable reason for leaving them out is that they constitute a sharp refutation of many of the allegations Karier has made against Dewey, as well as his larger effort to define progressives as sophisticated bigots. Far more eloquently than Karier, Dewey criticized the mental-testing movement, arguing cogently that the tests might become the basis for social stratification and an educational caste system. To have included Dewey's penetrating critique of testing would have compelled Karier to deal with complexity, for he would have found himself agreeing with one of his chief targets.

Another instance of the partisan, even shrill, tone of this volume is an essay by Russell Marks. Marks maintains that the Carnegie Corporation underwrote Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma because of the foundation's long-standing interest in blacks as "a valuable source of unskilled labor" and "a potential source of skilled labor." He asserts that the foundation's interest in blacks stemmed from Andrew Carnegie's realization of "the importance of fully utilizing Black labor," though he

finds it unnecessary to demonstrate how Carnegie influenced the decision to fund Myrdal's study some 20 years after Carnegie's death. Myrdal, writes Marks, was chosen by "big business" with the expectation that he would bring an environmental interpretation to his findings. Thus, Myrdal's report "tended to legitimize the social order," since it treated the Negro problem as a moral issue rather than as a problem of capitalistic exploitation. Liberals, businessmen, and others came to realize that they could achieve greater "social control and social efficiency" and at the same time turn blacks into skilled laborers and willing consumers if only discrimination were reduced. Marks concludes: "From this social milieu which gave priority to efficiency and productivity emerged the Brown decision." This interpretation of the origins of the Brown decision, with Myrdal, the Supreme Court, businessmen, the Carnegie Corporation, and the civil rights movement conspiring to free blacks in order to better repress them, supposedly shows that there was no real disagreement between conservatives and liberals. In sum, the dissension and controversy that preceded and followed the Brown decision were more apparent than real because the outcome served the interests of the capitalistic social order. Karier found Marks's tendentious account so persuasive that he incorporated ¹⁸ into his presentation of the nature-nurture issue.

The Great School Legend, by Colin Greer, editor of Social Policy magazine, is an effort to popularize the radical attack on liberalism and the public schools. It is not difficult for Greer to establish that not everyone succeeded in school and that some ethnic groups performed better than others. Much of his case rests on early twentieth century school surveys, which showed high rates of educational "retardation" for recent immigrants, especially Italians. Greer interprets this to mean that schools were designed to fail large numbers, particularly minority children: "The failure of many children has been, and still is, a learning experience precisely appropriate to the place assigned them and their families in the social order. They are being taught to fail and to accept their failure." But Greer, by accepting the surveys at face value, simply reinforces the cultural limitations of early school officials. John Walker

Briggs, in his study of the Italian immigrant experience, has directly challenged Greer's conclusions about Italian school "failure." Briggs shows that Greer, like early twentieth century researchers, confuses overage with failure. Briggs demonstrates, by matching pairs of Italian and non-Italian children in the same classes, that Italian children customarily started school later, did not fail any more often, and were likelier to have superior attendance records. Without having looked beyond the flawed original sources, Greer repeatedly asserts that the schools never promoted much mobility. Actually, he never seriously investigates whether or not there has been mobility, but instead sets forth his negative thesis in such sweeping, deterministic terms that it can neither be proved nor disproved. The school's mission, he holds, was "to prevent political, social, or economic upheaval," and every seeming reform was merely a calculated effort to defuse class antagonisms. The argument is circular: Nothing ever changes because every alleged change strengthens the system and is therefore no change at all. Such closed, inflexible reasoning offers no way to understand how educational policy is made and how it changes, nor does it advance an assessment of the reciprocal relationship between immigrants and schools.

Reason and Rhetoric: The Intellectual Foundations of Twentieth Century Liberal Educational Policy by Walter Feinberg, a philosopher of education at the University of Illinois, is another attack on liberalism and progressivism. His chief complaint is that liberals and progressives failed to perceive the "fundamental conflict" between "the requirements of justice and the needs of technology." Rejecting the ideal of equal opportunity as an unsuccessful effort to wed these two purposes, Feinberg argues instead for a Rawlsian concept of equality, based not on meritocratic grounds but on the principle of justice. While Feinberg deals harshly (and not always fairly) with the liberal tradition, his own position, as Wayne J. Urban of Georgia State University has ironically noted, "may well fit under the label of liberalism."⁸⁰ Dewey comes in for a large share of Feinberg's criticism, and much of it is based on the presentist assumption that Dewey should have known then what Feinberg knows now. For example, Feinberg perceives social class bias in John and Evelyn Dewey's Schools of To-Morrow, but

radicals who were Dewey's contemporaries saw it differently. The Modern School Journal, a publication of educational radicals, frequently recommended the book that Feinberg now calls "class biased."⁸¹ Feinberg believes that Dewey's pragmatism "prohibited thinking of human values, including freedom, in anything but provisional terms." This, he maintains, made Dewey a willing practitioner of social engineering and manipulation. Feinberg cites the following quotation from an article in 1917 in which Dewey was chiding pacifists for relying entirely on pure conscience:

If at a critical juncture the moving force of events is always too much for conscience, the remedy is not to deplore the wickedness of those who manipulate events. Such a conscience is largely self-conceit. The remedy is to connect conscience with the forces that are moving in another direction. Then will conscience itself have compulsive power instead of being forever the martyred and the coerced.

Feinberg comments on this statement: "It is questionable whether Dewey would have any room for the moral prophet unless he were successful in developing a political movement behind him. Certainly this statement would allow little room for the pacifism of World War I." This is an odd ground on which to criticize Dewey. Obviously, he was not trying to silence moral prophets; on the contrary, he was urging pacifists to organize in order to have an impact on policy. From his statement, it is clear that Dewey was urging pacifists to get involved in political action, to connect conscience "with the forces that are moving in another direction." Dewey was suggesting that while it is good to have progressive ideals and hopes, it is even better to bring them into being. Believing in the value of political efficacy is no fault, but rather represents a correct understanding of how policy is made in a democratic society: through a combination of organization and tactics that affects public opinion.⁸²

Feinberg blames liberal reformers for not achieving a truly just and egalitarian society, since they were willing to settle for less justice and equality than they should have. He chastises reformers for failing to

anticipate all the consequences of their actions and for failing to think and write the things that now seem obvious in retrospect. Progressives like Dewey and George Counts, he complains, were too willing to accept and encourage the advance of the technological society. Feinberg does not agree with Katz's hands-off attitude towards educational and social development (Reason and Rhetoric includes a sound critique of aspects of Katz's ideology); he thinks that reformers should have been more radical and more assertive in directing social change.

Feinberg does not explain how Dewey or Counts might have convinced industrialists to diminish their commitment to technology. Nor does he attempt to demonstrate the impact of Dewey's or Counts' writings. If Dewey and Counts and other progressives failed to question the rapid advance of technology and failed to understand how it would eventually affect American society, it may be that they were dazzled by technology's promise to improve the quality of life for the masses of people, to eliminate starvation, and to cure disease. Perhaps it was easier to foresee technology's benefits than to predict its spiritual and physical toll. Doubtless the modernizing process would have gone forward even if Dewey and Counts had never lived, just as it has in societies that never had a progressive movement. It is questionable whether a thoroughly radicalized, thoroughly Marxist Dewey and Counts would have had much impact at all on a society that was unresponsive to radical thought. They were men who lived in their times, not in ours, and it is unfair and ahistorical to expect them to have known what now seems apparent. Had they been radical enough to please their present critics, they would not have been central enough to be the focus of study today.

Rush Welter has commented, in a review of Feinberg and Karier, on their absorption with intellectual abstractions and their lack of "any useful sense of the frailty of human hopes." Neither author, he writes, "displays a sense that fallibility is part of the human condition rather than evidence of capitalist bias--that the errors of judgment and opinion men may detect today are quite likely to have been invisible or insurmountable for an earlier generation. . . . Similarly, neither seems to be aware of confusion and inadequacy as endemic human experiences." Instead, they "simply presuppose the existence, or rather the possibility, of a society in

which all of their truths are served simultaneously. They offer no empirical example of such a society, of course; to do so might involve them in practical comparisons that would call their theories into question." This, he says, is the "utopian theorizing" of "academics whose trade is spinning words and who are insulated by those words from direct contact with experience." It is unreasonable for a historian to expect men and women engaged in public life over a number of years never to err, always to know what should be done and how best to do it. Only those who feel quite certain themselves about the identity of the truth can expect it of others; historians above all should have a decent respect for the tentativeness of the truth and the unreliability of absolutists.

In the lead essay in Feinberg and Rosemont's collection, Work, Technology, and Education, James D. Anderson criticizes "liberal historians" who have written about the establishment of black public schools in the South. He writes that "the traditional liberal view . . . sees the rise of black schooling as the result of a humanitarian victory by a group of elite reformers over a reactionary white majority." He accuses scholars such as Louis Harlan, Horace Mann Bond, and Henry Bullock of "serious historical distortion" for treating Northern philanthropists as "patron saints" and Southern school reformers as idealists. His own view is that "black schooling was calculated to restrain black people and socialize them into a new form of subjection," specifically to train them as an inexpensive and docile labor force for the industrialization of the South.

Anderson misrepresents Harlan, Bond, and Bullock. Their work encompasses his views, but with a far more sophisticated sense of the complexity of causes and effects than Anderson has. None of them has the naively optimistic perspective that he attributes to them. The very title of Harlan's book--Separate and Unequal: Public School Campaigns and Racism in the Southern Seaboard States, 1901-1915--contradicts Anderson's contention. The racism of the public school campaigners, both Northerners and Southerners, is a central theme in Harlan's book. He describes a Southern leader of the public school campaign, North Carolina Governor Charles B. Aycock, as a representative of the "conservative wing of the White Supremacy movement. A tacit bargain with him underlay the

whole educational movement and dictated its tactical methods. The philanthropists acquiesced in disfranchisement and Jim Crow laws and undertook to promote acquiescence in the North." Page after page, Harlan relates how the Northern industrialists sold out the claims of the blacks to equal status, how they directed their vast funds to support industrial education for blacks, and how they tolerated the racism of their Southern associates.

Bullock and Bond are similarly distorted by Anderson. Bullock specifically describes the economic motives of the Northern industrialists; one of them, writes Bullock, "went South as a businessman conscious of the value of Negro labor. He considered this labor necessary to the efficient operation of his railroad, for he needed thousands of Negro workers--but needed them trained." He too documents the racism of the Northerners who promoted caste education for blacks. Bond, writing four decades earlier than Anderson, while Southern black schools were still at the mercy of white racists and still dependent on Northern philanthropy, was no Pollyanna; he criticized industrial education and its sponsors. But he did write appreciatively of the role that Northern philanthropy had played in stimulating public responsibility for black schools and in providing higher education for blacks. Writing in 1934, he viewed the philanthropic effort strictly within the political context of the alternatives. He believed that half a loaf, perhaps even just a slice, was better than nothing at all, and he knew that most Southern whites, if left to their own initiative, would have preferred no black schools.

In addition to misstating the interpretations of "liberal historians," Anderson distorts some of his original sources for the sake of his argument. He says that Edgar Gardner Murphy, a Southern school reformer, wrote that

black education, like slavery, was to serve as a system for restraint. Murphy viewed the purpose of black education as that of arresting the upward and downward momentum of blacks. The education of blacks was defined as dangerous if it allowed them to descend into industrial inefficiency. Black schooling was viewed as equally dangerous if

it encouraged blacks to desire the same economic, social, and political status as whites. The function of schooling was to exercise restraint.

But Murphy was writing about slavery, not about black education. This is what he wrote:

Slavery was nothing if not a system of restraint. . . . This bondage fixed, instinctively, a limit beyond which the negro must not ascend; it fixed a limit below which the negro must not fall. It operated in both directions as a check. . . . Upon the two tendencies of the negro thus held in check, the effect of emancipation must be evident. Restraint withdrawn, negro life is released in two directions--the smaller number of better negroes is permitted to rise, and many of them do rise; the larger number of weaker negroes is permitted to fall, and most of them do fall.

A somewhat comical example of slipshod research occurs when Anderson quotes a black bishop who told a Congressional committee that Southern blacks needed better educational opportunities. Anderson writes, "Halsey [sic] could certainly make such statements as he had made himself literate by studying graves in the woods during slavery." That might have been a remarkable way to become literate, but it is not the way that Bishop Halsey learned to read. According to his testimony, he bought a Webster's speller and dictionary and taught himself to read while still a slave. After emancipation, he decided that he "would abandon everything and go into the woods and learn how to read and write properly." Each day for two years, he went into the woods with books on grammar, spelling, geography, writing, history, and theology. This is indeed an inspiring story of self-education. But where did Anderson get the idea that Bishop Halsey made himself literate "by studying graves in the woods"? From a boldface subtitle in the midst of Halsey's printed testimony, "Grave Studies in the Woods," in which "grave" is a synonym for "serious."⁸⁸

Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis's Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life is a straightforward Marxist critique of American education and society. Both authors are economists on the faculty of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and both are active in the Union for Radical Political Economics. Their thesis is that the schools reproduce the economic order. According to what they call the correspondence principle, the structure of employment, particularly the relations of power within the modern corporation, dominates the structure of schools and colleges.

Their presentation of American educational history reflects their Marxist perspective. Events of the past are shown either to correspond to capitalist imperatives or to be contradictions generated by capitalism. They chide the radical historians for portraying educational development as the result of class domination rather than class conflict. The real function of the schools, they maintain, is to prepare youths for their adult roles, not to further economic equality nor to encourage full human development. They attribute the failure of the radical school reform movement to its insufficient understanding of the subordination of the schools to the capitalist economy.

Why is it, Bowles and Gintis ask, that family background continues to have as much influence over educational attainment as it did 30 years ago? Why is it that "the substantial equalization of educational attainments over the years has not led measurably to an equalization in income among individuals?" They contend that inequality is transmitted from generation to generation, not by superior genes or superior ability, but by the "structure of production and property relations" under capitalism. A major role of the educational system is "in hiding or justifying the exploitative nature of the U.S. economy." Specifically, the schools prepare youth for "the undemocratic and class-based character of economic life in the United States." Schools reproduce the class structure by teaching students to accept relationships of dominance and subordination, fragmenting them into stratified status groups by race, sex, and social class, and preparing "reserve armies of skilled labor," all under the rubric of the "technocratic-meritocratic" ideology of equal opportunity.⁸⁹

Bowles and Gintis's attitude toward the United States's economic system is central to their analysis. As Marxists, they find it "highly dictatorial," "profoundly undemocratic," "autocratic," and "formally totalitarian," because "the actions of the vast majority (workers) are controlled by a small minority (owners and managers)." It is, furthermore, typified by the "hierarchical division of labor and bureaucratic authority" and systematically stratified by "race, sex, education, and social class." Hierarchy, bureaucracy, and social stratification are utilized by capitalists to stabilize this "totalitarian system of economic power." Since economic inequality and social injustice are systemic to capitalism, educational policy is an ineffective lever of change.⁹⁰

The proliferation of corporations and bureaucracies has turned white-collar workers into a new proletariat, in their view, as alienated and powerless as assembly-line workers. The only historical analogies they can find for our present form of capitalist hierarchical control are "the Southern slave-plantation sector," and possibly the post-Civil War sharecropping and crop-lien systems. Not surprisingly, they find that capitalism is at the root of all our present problems: "Capitalism and the 'Anxious Society' are one. Drugs, suicide, mental instability, personal insecurity, predatory sexuality, depression, loneliness, bigotry, and hatred mark the perennial fears of Americans." The only appropriate response to this monstrous set of conditions is revolution, because the American economy is "the most extensive and complete wage-labor system in the history of civilization . . . repressive and anachronistic, an obstacle to further human progress."⁹¹

The authors call their revolution "socialist" and "democratic," but their referents are never socialist democracies like Sweden or Israel. Instead, they hail the revolutionary "socialism" of such nations as the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, Cuba, and China. And, while appealing to the antiauthoritarian sympathies of American radicals, they ultimately advise "socialist" educators to "reject simple antiauthoritarianism and spontaneity" as insufficiently "revolutionary," "barren and naively individualistic."⁹²

Bowles and Gintis are quite right that family background continues to influence educational attainment (a relationship well documented by American social

science), though the power and the persistence of that relationship are not necessarily as certain as they indicate. As noted earlier in this paper, William H. Sewell has found that no more than 18% of the variance in educational attainment can be explained solely by socioeconomic background, and Hauser and Featherman have concluded that the relative importance of social background on educational attainment has apparently declined in recent years. In a free society, government can try to neutralize social differences by subsidizing tuition, but it cannot (or at least has not) actually penalized children from advantaged homes as a means of advancing equality. Thus, it is not surprising that educated parents are likelier to implant higher educational aspirations in their children and are more capable of paying for advanced education than are those parents who have little education and low income. What is surprising is that, according to recent sociological studies, the same phenomenon occurs in the Soviet Union, where the best places in the best schools, as well as the best grades, seem to go disproportionately to children of the highest social strata.⁹³

Bowles and Gintis buttress their argument for the economic irrelevance of education by contending that income inequality has remained constant since 1910 (though prominent economists like Arthur Okun and Simon Kuznets maintain that income inequality was significantly reduced during World War II). A different light was cast on this issue by economist Morton Paglin. Paglin holds that the usual concept of income equality fails to take into account the different income needs of families at different stages of the life cycle. He argues that perfect equality would mean "equal incomes for all families at the same stage of their life cycle, but not necessarily equal incomes between different age groups." Additionally, Paglin points out that the actual extent of inequality is exaggerated

by a statistical decision to exclude need-based in-kind transfers from the definition of income. As a matter of social policy, we have decided to mitigate poverty by making large transfers in the form of public housing, rent supplements, food stamps and food assistance, medicaid, and

social services We then blithely exclude these transfers from the statistics on poverty and inequality and wonder about the lack of improvement in the share allotted to the lowest quintile!

Based on readjustments for age and transfer payments, Paglin concludes that there has been a significant reduction in the degree of income inequality since World War II.⁹⁴

It is doubtful that capitalism is the independent variable in all of the social and political sicknesses described by Bowles and Gintis. Bureaucracy and hierarchical control are not unique to capitalist societies. If anything, these institutional forms are even more firmly entrenched in Marxist and socialist countries. And, anyone acquainted with the societies lauded by the authors must feel some skepticism about the claims of greater personal freedom in Marxist "democracies."

To be sure, there are aspects of Bowles and Gintis's critique of American society that are worthy of attention. It is valuable and stimulating to perceive the totality of American education from a Marxist perspective. Unfortunately, even when they document their points with solid evidence, their analysis hews so uncritically to Marxist conventionalities that the overall impression is of a one-sided polemic, whose logic is reductionist and whose questions are raised with answers in hand.

One of the most perplexing dilemmas for radical critics is whether to stress liberty or equality as the most important end for society. Most of them simply ignore the tension between the two values and assume that it is possible to have a society and a kind of schooling where both liberty and equality are maximized, while bureaucracy and administrative system are minimized, if not eliminated altogether. That this is a chimera is apparent to Bowles and Gintis, who know that revolutionary egalitarianism cannot be achieved without extensive political and social controls. At the other extreme is Joel Spring, who is an anarchist concerned with individual liberty. It stands to reason that an egalitarian society must have a coercive governmental bureaucracy with the power to make people equal; similarly, Spring's opposition

to the "existence of the state in any form" presupposes acceptance of extreme inequality. Degrees of liberty are purchased with degrees of equality, and vice versa. Spring is against all governments, whether communist or democratic: the former are openly autocratic, while the latter require the individual "to sacrifice his autonomy either to the majority or to a representative." As an anarchist, he rejects all institutions, whether school, church, or family, that try "to make the individual into something."⁹⁵

Spring's Education and the Rise of the Corporate State relates the history of twentieth century American education from an anarchist perspective. The first sentence states his theme: "The corporate image of society turned American schools into a central social institution for the production of men and women who conformed to the needs and expectations of a corporate and technocratic world." The public schools "were organized to meet the needs of the corporate state and consequently, to protect the interests of the ruling elite and the technological machine." The corporate state was the creature of businessmen, labor leaders, and progressive politicians. All combined to eliminate obsolete individualism and to spread the gospel of cooperation and social purpose.⁹⁶

The major victory of progressivism, he believes, was to instill in teachers and pupils the importance of group endeavor and the value of dedication to the common good. The well-schooled child was a conformist, ready to sacrifice himself for the group. The specific mechanisms for downgrading individualism were: the removal of competition for grades and awards; group projects; efforts to meet the needs of children and their families with vacation schools, social centers, parks, playgrounds, and other recreational facilities; anti-urban activities like summer camps; extracurricular activities like clubs, athletics, assemblies, and student government. All of these seemingly beneficent or innocuous activities, writes Spring, "involved control of behavior through training and mental forms of persuasion. In a sense the American revolution replaced the use of force with education as a means of maintaining social order."⁹⁷

Spring detects a compromise by the individual in any activity that is planned for the good of society. He criticizes guidance because it was "one form of education

designed to make the economic system run efficiently for the benefit of all. But vocational guidance was only part of a general educational plan to turn society into one large corporation of brotherly love. Another part of the plan was the creation of a guaranteed annual income that would condition men to think in terms of working for the good of society." On this count, many twentieth century liberals are guilty as charged, for they have consistently urged the consideration of the good of society, and in recent years, many have even advocated that American society would be better, more just, and more equal if there were something like a guaranteed annual income.⁹⁸

In A Primer of Libertarian Education, Spring carries the anarchist analysis further. He holds that "a new society cannot be born unless a new person is born that can function within it." Spring agrees with Wilhelm Reich, who linked the "authoritarian character structure" to authoritarian child-rearing methods and sexual repression. To achieve freedom, Spring proposes the following: first, the elimination of the school, because it attempts to mold children "into some particular moral or social ideal"; second, the abolition of the nuclear family, which is responsible for perpetuating middle-class morality and denying freedom to women; third, the removal of adolescent restrictions: "at as early an age as possible the child must become a miniature adult, a person exercising all the rights and privileges that we now confer on adults." This last proposal would be accomplished by making children legally "free" at the age of 12 or 13 and guaranteeing them a government income until the age of 21. To assure adolescent sexual freedom, special residences would be set up (by government?) and birth control devices supplied. All of this would lead to a libertarian society, where children were free from repressive authority and assured of "genital freedom." Spring's utopia sounds remarkably like an adolescent fantasy: If only kids had money, sex, and freedom from being hassled by parents, then everything else in society would be okay.

Much of the historical background in A Primer of Libertarian Education was first set out by Spring in his essay "Anarchism in Education" in Roots of Crisis. The thrust of his historical research has been an attempt to create an anarchist tradition in education, one that is

relevant to the present. While there is certainly a radical tradition of richness and depth, it remains questionable whether there is a usable anarchist past. Spring's case for an anarchist tradition is frequently based on adroit picking and choosing among his original sources--ignoring certain arguments, emphasizing others, and when necessary, blending the activities of anarchists with those of non-anarchist radicals and non-radical progressives.

Spring cites William Godwin's argument against national systems of education in 1793 as an early expression of anarchism in education. But, in his recounting of Godwin's position, Spring refers only to the third of Godwin's three objections, namely, that government might use its control of educational institutions to maintain itself in power and to stifle free inquiry. And, in a grotesque overstatement, Spring claims that Godwin was proven right because "whether in Nazi Germany or in the United States, clearly the school by its very nature had become an institution for political control."¹⁰⁰

Spring neglects to mention Godwin's other objections to national (or public) education. Godwin argued that

all public establishments include in them the idea of permanence. . . . They actively restrain the flights of mind and fix it in the belief of exploded errors. It has commonly been observed of universities and extensive establishments for the purpose of education that the knowledge taught there is a century behind the knowledge which exists among the unshackled and unprejudiced members of the same political community.

It would certainly be difficult to maintain that universities, public or private, in the United States today are bastions of prejudice and backward thinking. Godwin was wrong, though he could not have been expected to have foreseen the emergence of traditions of decentralized control and academic freedom.¹⁰¹

Godwin's second concern about national education was an objection to the very concept of public beneficence. "Whatever each man does for himself is done well; whatever his neighbors or his country undertake to do for him is

done ill." This is quintessential anarchism, but it is a political view that would today be associated with the John Birch Society, rather than educational radicals.¹⁰²

Another example of purposeful selection is Spring's treatment of the educational ideas of Francisco Ferrer, a radical Spanish educator who was executed as an insurrectionary in 1909. Very likely his crime was his founding of the Modern School in Barcelona in 1901, a free-thinking institution that was directly, openly critical of the Spanish government, the Catholic church, capitalism, and every other conventional dogma of the time.

Spring describes Ferrer as an anarchist educator who exemplifies Spring's belief that schools should not impose any particular goals on their pupils nor mold their character in any way. Ferrer, however, in his own writings presents a very different picture of his efforts. The Modern School was created not as an anarchist school, but as a "Modern, Scientific, and Rational School" (its original name). Ferrer opposed dogma of every manner, but he did not eschew character-forming activities. He believed that "a rational and scientific education would preserve children from error, inspire men with a love of good conduct, and reorganize society in accord with the demands of justice." Ferrer had his own values, as well as his own notion of what constituted "error," "good conduct," and "the demands of justice." Furthermore, the Modern School had what Ferrer called

a discreet and systematic campaign against [uncleanliness], showing the children how a dirty person or object inspires repugnance, and how cleanliness attracts esteem and sympathy; how one instinctively moves toward the cleanly person and away from the dirty and malodorous; and how we should be pleased to win the regard of those who see us and ashamed to excite their disgust.

Spring ignores the Modern School's hygiene program, which was a kind of socialization, though he quickly condemns similar efforts in American public schools as techniques of social control.¹⁰³

Spring establishes artificial barriers between progressives and radicals in his rendering of early

twentieth century history, and he persistently distorts and caricatures the progressive tradition. Progressives, he contends, were builders of the compulsory corporate state, while radicals and anarchists were critics of the repressive mainstream. His own evidence demonstrates that this is a false polarity, an untenable oversimplification of the swirling intellectual currents of the period. He does not acknowledge the extent to which ideas and personalities crossed ideological and political lines during the progressive era. He claims the work of George Counts and Scott Nearing as part of the radical tradition, but they were also part of the progressive movement. Dewey was a progressive, but he frequently allied himself with radicals and anarchists on particular issues, and they in turn frequently borrowed his ideas.

Spring's admiring treatment of the Modern School at Stelton, New Jersey, reveals the limitations of his approach. He cites the school as an example of a successful libertarian school but fails to acknowledge its debt to progressive educational thought. Having declared himself an advocate of the radical-anarchist-libertarian tradition, he ascribes whatever is good in the school to its radical heritage, but overlooks practices and ideas that he would criticize in public institutions. For instance, while he detects "romantic pastoralism" and "anti-urban feeling" in public school officials who take city children to the country or encourage nature study, he sees nothing of the kind when radicals open boarding schools for workers' children in rural settings, such as the Manumit School in Pawling, New York, "located on a 177-acre farm with cattle, hills, and a stream for swimming and fishing," or the Modern School at Stelton, established on 68 acres "out in God's open country," far from "the conventionalities and shams of city life."¹⁰⁴

The Modern School was founded in 1913 not only by anarchists and radicals, but by socialists, single-taxers, free-thinkers, and labor unionists; significantly, its list of supporters included the Progressive Education Association. In its first decade, the school went through a succession of teachers, each with his or her own understanding of libertarian education. But despite the turnover of teachers, there was a consistency of approach that reflected the ferment within progressive circles. The emphasis was on getting away from abstract academic studies and moving toward a program of active learning, or

"self-activity." One teacher called it "Heart, Hand, and Head." Others, like Alexis and Elizabeth Fern, who directed the school for many years, favored manual training, handicrafts, the arts, workshops, and other non-abstract kinds of learning. It is clear as one reads accounts of the Modern School that while its supporters' politics were more radical than that of progressives, their educational ideas flowed from many of the same sources.¹⁰⁵

Spring's programmatic suggestions at the conclusion of A Primer of Libertarian Education raise important questions about the nature of freedom. How far can an anarchist go in imposing his views on others and still remain an anarchist? He never explains why it is any less coercive to socialize children to anarchism than to socialize them to some other ideal of the good life. What he offers is compulsory libertarianism, legislative enactments to destroy the nuclear family and other traditional institutions. Those parents who want to educate their children traditionally would find the power of the compulsory libertarian state arrayed against them. It is a curious contrast with our present, much-maligned society, where anarchists and libertarians are free to reject compulsory marriage, free to avoid public schools, and free to raise their children as they please. Those who agree with Spring have far greater personal choice at present than would those who disagree with him in his projected new society. In his libertarian utopia, the individual would be "freed" from his roots, his culture, his family, his history, and ultimately, the confines of his own identity. It is a prescription for the fully anomic society.

After A Primer of Libertarian Education, Spring published The Sorting Machine: National Educational Policy Since 1945. While maintaining his libertarian perspective, Spring avoids the excessive politicization and romantic distortions of his earlier works and connects to reality in a way that they fail to do. Without resort to polemical bravura, he questions whether Americans' emphasis on schooling as a mechanism of social reform and economic development has unnecessarily compromised concern for individual development. This point, which was also made in Rita Kramer's biography of Maria Montessori to explain the rejection of her individualistic methods by progressive educators, deserves further serious

consideration. The Sorting Machine suggests the possibility that the radical-anarchist orientation, when grounded in a realistic sense of American politics and disciplined by historical craftsmanship, might make important contributions to our understanding of educational policy.¹⁰⁶

VII

Educational history, whether written by intellectual historians, social historians, or economic historians, offers broad vistas for new and significant research into human behavior, social processes, and political decision making. The issues are complicated, and they go directly to the core of American life and thought. Freed of the Cubberleyan tradition, educational historians are studying, among other things, family and community life, the communications media, religion, race, ethnicity, and group biography. With a perspective informed by the social sciences, historians are using new techniques to reinvestigate old issues and ask new questions. The school is seen as one of a number of educating institutions that influenced the lives of Americans. While this conception of education may seem to derogate the role of the school, it does more nearly approximate the educative experiences of most Americans.

In light of these trends, it becomes increasingly difficult to write about the school historically without setting it within a wide social context. But it is one thing to assess the political, economic, and social functions of the school and quite another to "discover" these functions as though they were clandestine purposes, hidden until now by capitalist conspirators. The difference in emphasis is the difference between a political analysis of history and a politicization of history. The former seeks to understand causes and effects in their historical context, the latter imposes a particular interpretation on past events.

Politicization has many risks, the greatest of which is that it frequently forces a telescoping and distortion of the past for the sake of explaining the present. The presentist method involves projecting one's own ideas onto the past in search of the seeds of present problems. The more passionate a writer, the likelier he is to treat the

past as a precursor of the great goodness or great evil of the present, rather than on its own terms. While present-day problems obviously have their origins in the past, the historical inquiry must be informed by a respect for the importance of context. Nothing that exists today has precisely the same meaning that it had a century ago; the perceptions of the 1970s are not the same as those of other eras.

As David Hackett Fischer has pointed out, the impulse to use history for political purposes is not new; it has been indulged in by scholars of all political persuasions, by Communists and anti-Communists, by conservatives and liberals, and most recently, by young radical historians, who

regard all aspirations to objectivity as a sham and a humbug, and stubbornly insist that the real question is not whether historians can be objective, but which cause they will be subjective to. . . . To make historiography into a vehicle for propaganda is simply to destroy it. . . . The fact that earlier generations and other ideological groups have committed the same wrong does not convert it into a right.¹⁰⁷

Educational history is a particularly tempting arena for politicization because of the ready availability of the public school as a straw man, a panacea that failed. School officials and reformers spoke glowingly of the Great American Public School, the Bulwark of Democracy, that was supposed to make everyone equal and happy and successful. As more people stayed in school longer, society was supposed to become better and wiser. But clearly everyone is not equal and happy and successful, nor have inequality, injustice, war, and corruption vanished with the extension of schooling. Therefore, say the politicized historians, the people who sold us on schooling deceived us; the schools were a fraud from the beginning and intentionally so.

But this is a simplistic rendering of the past. There have been at least two traditions of education commentary that exist side by side. One lauds the greatness of the public school, the other laments its lowly state. The first was the creation of promoters and

local officials, waging intensive campaigns for public funds and stressing the accomplishments of the schools. The other was what Richard Hofstadter referred to as "a literature of acid criticism and bitter complaint." The two traditions interacted, for the propagandists knew that the American public had to be convinced of the value of schooling, in terms of their own reality. No one in the nineteenth or early twentieth century was taken in by rhetoric alone, particularly when it contradicted one's own experience. There were plenty of people who had gotten ahead without much schooling. The Horatio Alger rags-to-riches stories were not testimonials to the schools, but to the rewards of hard work, good character, and luck. As Hofstadter showed, Americans have had an anti-intellectual strain that precluded any automatic respect for credentials; typically, schooling was appreciated for its cash value, not as an engine of social reconstruction. Schoolmen, addressing a skeptical public that held the purse strings, alternately spoke rhapsodically and despairingly of the schools that might be and the schools that were.¹⁰⁸

From this mixed bag of hope, despair, promise, and complaint, and from a motley company of idealists, pragmatists, cynics, and moralists, the politicized historians select the passages and the quotes that make their case against American schooling and the liberal tradition. A history that is rich with controversy and complexity is reduced to a simple ideological line. The school is a failure, they tell us, without giving us a deeper understanding of what the schools have and have not accomplished. Bureaucracy is antihumanistic and unnecessary, they agree, without providing an analysis that would enable us to control and redirect the bureaucratic process, whose reach is enlarged by every new demand for governmental services and regulation.

By contrast, a political analysis of educational history asks a series of open-ended, empirical questions: How was education policy made? What educational issues were involved? Who participated? What was their self-interest and how did they perceive it? How were the issues resolved? How did the participants try to influence the outcome? Who gained what? Who lost what? What alternatives were available? Why were they rejected? How did the press and other influential agencies affect the issue? How did the resolution of the

issue affect the original problem? The questions could be multiplied; the important criterion is that the answer is not presumed by the question.

History-writing has political implications; it influences public opinion and policymaking. Politicized history, written in reaction to the mood of the moment, is likely to become dated as the mood of the moment fades. The most useful and most relevant approach to educational history is that which seeks to determine how ideas are translated into policy, how policy is translated into practice, how practice grows into policy, how schools respond or fail to respond to various kinds of aspirations, how families mediate their children's education, how social origins affect educational opportunity, and how political, social, and economic forces interrelate to affect the educational process. The possibilities for study are as boundless as the question of how knowledge, skills, values, and sensibilities are transmitted across time, across generations, and across cultures. An understanding of the democratic political process, a respect for rational inquiry, and a capacity for surprise are necessary equipment for those who attempt to reconstruct a sense of the past and to understand the role of education in it.

Notes

1. R. Jackson Wilson, "United States: The Reassessment of Liberalism," *The New History*, ed. by Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), pp. 90-102.
2. Bernard Bailyn, *Education in the Forming of American Society* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), pp. 8-9, 14, 53.
3. Lawrence A. Cremin, *The Wonderful World of Ellwood Patterson Cubberley* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1965); Ellwood P. Cubberley, *Public Education in the United States* (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin, rev. 1934, orig. pub. 1919).
4. Cremin, *Wonderful World*, pp. 43, 46-47; Lawrence A.

Cremén, American Education: The Colonial Experience, 1607-1783 (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. x.; Lawrence A. Cremén, "The Curriculum Maker and His Critics: A Persistent American Problem," Teachers College Record, Volume 54 (1952-53), p. 234.

5. Douglas Sloan, "Historiography and the History of Education," Review of Research in Education, ed. by Fred N. Kerlinger (Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock, 1973), I, 239-269.

6. John H. Bunzel, Anti-Politics in America: Reflections on the Anti-Political Temper and Its Distortions of the Democratic Process (New York: Knopf, 1967). The British economist John Vaizey wrote recently that the political outlook of the New Left

included extreme hostility towards liberalism, impatience with older social problems, crude anti-Americanism and association with left-wing nationalism elsewhere. . . . Its latent anti-intellectualism and willingness to contemplate violence were reminders of what profoundly reactionary consequences such concepts have had in the past. Education: The State of the Debate in America, Britain and Canada (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 31-32.

7. Bowles and Gintis (p. 230) include David Tyack, Carl Kaestle, and Marvin Lazerson as part of this radical strand of revisionism. While the work of these historians includes some of the radical themes, each has criticized central elements of the radical analysis.

Tyack in The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 10, disputes the radical interpretation of "social control" and "reform by imposition";

'Social control' exists in some form in every organized society from the Bushmen to the Eskimos and in every epoch of recorded history. To announce that schools 'impose' on students is hardly news; even the 'free school' movement shows signs of recognizing that. The important questions, I believe, are the intent, methods,

and effects of the social control or imposition, which can take diverse forms. I would argue that there is quite a moral and educational difference between forcing a Catholic child in a public classroom to read the King James Bible against the teachings of his parents and priest and trying to make him literate; quite a difference between whipping children for not learning their lessons and teaching them to be punctual. One may have legitimate doubts about literacy and punctuality, but they should at least be distinguished from religious bigotry and sadism as forms of 'imposition'.

Kaestle, in The Evolution of an Urban School System: New York City, 1750-1850 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 161, 178, attributes bureaucratization not only to the reformers' sense of moral mission, but also to "common sense" and the "pressure of numbers"; standardization stemmed not just from a middle-class preference for efficiency and conformity, but from "the desire to be fair to all those who would accept the rules of the system, and the desire to raise the quality of teaching." In 1972, he wrote:

What we need and do not yet have is a new synthesis that will account for the school as the focal point of idealism as well as self-interest, an institution that evolves more by mundane accretion than dramatic reform and yet continually arouses herculean efforts and exaggerated expectations. Most of all, we need a synthesis that abjures the premise that the American school has been an unequivocal failure, for such a premise--like the earlier presumption of success--precludes the explanation of change over time. "Social Reform and the Urban School," History of Education Quarterly, Summer 1972, p. 217.

Lazerson has written that "the revisionist portrait too often substitutes rhetoric for analysis" and has warned that the new historiography might be as moralistic, as static, as presentist, and as simplistic as the old:

In part, the problem lies in the failure to recognize that schools play multiple roles, some in conflict with one another, others not completely rationalized. For some individuals and groups, schools have been avenues of upward mobility. How much, how often, and in what ways remain unclear, but certainly they cannot simply be dismissed as oppressors of the working class. Nor can schools just be closed with the assurance or even the expectation that their oppressive features will thereby disappear from society. "Revisionism and American Educational History," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1973), pp. 282-283.

8. Lazerson, "Revisionism and American Educational History," p. 270.

9. For illustrative examples of these themes, see Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform, pp. 1, 50, 53, 86, 130-131; Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools, pp. xviii-xxiv, 39, 108-110, 115-116, 122; Karier, Violas, and Spring, Roots of Crisis, pp. 3-4, 6-7, 9-12, 22, 39, 88; Karier, Shaping the American Educational State, pp. xx, 2-9, 138-139, 144; Greer, The Great School Legend, pp. 3-4, 33-56, 74-79, 109-111, 152; Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State, pp. 1, 2, 72, 75, 87-89, 162-163. These themes are employed selectively by Feinberg and by Bowles and Gintis. See Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 39, 171-172, 197-199, 235-236; see also Feinberg's critique of the radical historians on pp. 236-262. See Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America, pp. 18-19, 27-30, 39, 186, 227, 234; for their critique of the radical historians, see pp. 235-241, 250-263.

10. In Education and the Rise of the Corporate State (pp. 100-103), Spring cites Counts's role as a radical critic, but both Counts and Curti are elsewhere criticized as liberals; see Karier, Violas, and Spring, Roots of Crisis, pp. 3-5; Karier, Shaping the American Educational State, pp. 4-5; and Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 100-103, 202-207.

11. Kaestle, "Social Reform and the Urban School," p. 216.

12. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform, p. 1; Greer, The Great School Legend, p. 3. See, also, Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools, pp. xxi, 123; Karier, Violas, and Spring, Roots of Crisis, pp. 2-5; Bowles and Gintis, pp. 225-230.

13. Sloan, "Historiography and the History of Education," pp. 247-248.

14. John E. Talbot, "Education in Intellectual and Social History," Historical Studies Today, ed. by Felix Gilbert and Stephen R. Graubard (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), pp. 195-196.

15. Robert W. Hodge and Donald J. Treiman, "Class Identification in the United States," American Journal of Sociology, Volume 73, Number 5, 1968, pp. 535-547.

16. Rush Welter, "Reason, Rhetoric, and Reality in American Educational History," The Review of Education, Volume 2, January/February 1976, pp. 94-96.

17. For a survey of the ideology of vocationalism, see Marvin Lazerson and W. Norton Grubb, ed., American Education and Vocationalism, A Documentary History, 1870-1970 (New York: Teachers College Press, 1974); also, Marvin Lazerson, The Origins of the Urban School: Public Education in Massachusetts, 1870-1915 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

18. Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools, pp. xviii, xx, xxii-xxiii, xxiv, 108, 122. See, also, Greer, pp. 72-76; Bowles and Gintis, pp. 55-56, 186, 192; Karier, "Testing in the Corporate Liberal State," Roots of Crisis, p. 126; Spring, "Deschooling as a Form of Social Revolution," Roots of Crisis, p. 143.

19. Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools, p. 9; Kaestle, "Social Reform and the Urban School," p. 214; Kaestle, The Evolution of an Urban School System, p. 182.

20. Diane Ravitch, The Great School Wars: New York City, 1805-1973 (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 79-133; Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools, pp. 15, 20.

21. Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools, p. 22.

22. David C. Hammack, "The Centralization of New York City's Public School System, 1896: A Social Analysis of a Decision," unpub. masters' thesis, Columbia University, 1969; Ravitch, pp. 134-186; Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State, pp. 85-90. Greer notes that the leadership of the newly centralized system passed rapidly from the Protestant reformers to the ethnic minorities (pp. 81-82).
23. William H. Maxwell, "School Achievements in New York," Educational Review, XLIV, 1912, pp. 275-309; Ravitch, pp. 179-180, 219-226; Greer, p. 120; Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State, pp. 62-90.
24. Selwyn K. Troen, The Public and the Schools: Shaping the St. Louis System, 1838-1920 (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1975), pp. 151, 224-226.
25. Spring, "Deschooling," Roots of Crisis, p. 143; Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform, pp. 90-91; Greer, pp. 93, 99, 109; Bowles and Gintis, pp. 8, 85; Karier, Shaping the American Educational State, p. 2.
26. Stephan Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 112-113, 162-165, 223.
27. See, Stephan Thernstrom and Richard Sennett, eds., Nineteenth Century Cities: Essays in the New Urban History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); Tamara K. Hareven, ed., Anonymous Americans: Explorations in Nineteenth Century Social History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971); Kenneth Jackson and Stanley Schultz, eds., Cities in American History (New York: Knopf, 1972); Stephan Thernstrom, "Reflections on the New Urban History," in Gilbert and Graubard, eds., Historical Studies Today, p. 329; Stephan Thernstrom, The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis, 1880-1970 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 257-258.
28. Thomas Kessner, "The Golden Door: Immigrant Mobility in New York City, 1880-1915," unpub. doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1975, pp. 266-267, 277-279. (Kessner's book is being published in 1977 by

Oxford University Press with the title The Golden Door: Italian and Jewish Immigrant Mobility in New York City, 1880-1915.) Selma Berrol of the City University of New York is presently analyzing recently-discovered record books from late nineteenth century New York City public schools; thus far, she has found that school attendance relates neither to class nor to nativity, but to family's length of residence in the city.

29. Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools, p. 121; Greer, pp. 80, 83; David Tyack, "A Tract for the Times," The Andover Review, Vol. I, No. 1, 1974, p. 135.
30. Bowles and Gintis, p. 110.
31. Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, The American Occupational Structure (New York: Wiley, 1967) pp. 77-78.
32. Ibid., p. 157.
33. Ibid., p. 201.
34. Ibid., p. 432-435.
35. Ibid., p. 113; see, Seymour Martin Lipset's "Equality and Inequality," in Robert Merton and Robert Nisbet's Contemporary Social Problems (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1976), Fourth Edition, Chapter 7.
36. Christopher Jencks, Marshall Smith, Henry Acland, Mary Jo Bane, David Cohen, Herbert Gintis, Barbara Heyns, and Stephan Michelson, Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America (New York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 7-8, 176, 179, 181, 185, 191, 196.
37. James S. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966); Frederick Mosteller and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, eds., On Equality of Educational Opportunity (New York: Random House, 1972); Daniel Bell, "On Meritocracy and Equality," The Public Interest, Number 29, Fall 1972, pp. 29-68; Robert Nisbet, "The Pursuit of Equality," The Public Interest, Number 35, Spring 1974, pp. 103-120.
38. Blau and Duncan, p. 233.

39. Andrew M. Greeley, "The Ethnic Miracle," The Public Interest, Number 45, Fall 1976, pp. 20-36.
40. Blau and Duncan, pp. 209-210.
41. Ibid., pp. 210-212.
42. Karier, Shaping the American Educational State, p. 408; Bowles and Gintis, p. 6; see also, Feinberg, pp. 22-23, 163-164.
43. Karier, Shaping the American Educational State, pp. xvi, 281; W. Vance Grant and C. George Lind, Digest of Educational Statistics (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 152.
44. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1974 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 14-15, 150-154.
45. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
46. Ibid., pp. 27, 42-43.
47. Ibid., p. 37.
48. Ralph W. Tyler, "The Federal Role in Education," The Public Interest, Number 34, Winter 1974, p. 170.
49. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Current Population Reports: Population Characteristics, School Enrollment--Social and Economic Characteristics of Students," October 1975, pp. 10-11, 7-8; "Black College Enrollment Held Equal to Population Proportion," New York Times, December 4, 1975, p. 33; Social and Economic Status of the Black Population, pp. 94-95.
50. Robert M. Hauser and David L. Featherman, "Occupations and Social Mobility in the United States," speech delivered at the American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting in Boston, Mass., February 1976, pp. 2-5; Robert M. Hauser and David L. Featherman, "Socioeconomic Achievements of U.S. Men, 1962-1972," Science (July 26, 1974), pp. 325-331.
51. David L. Featherman, "Schooling and Social Mobility in Modern America," speech delivered at Franklin and Marshall College, March 1, 1976, p. 12. Hauser and Featherman have made their major findings available in various articles and speeches; their complete study will be published in book form in the near future.
52. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
53. Lipset, op. cit.
54. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform, pp. 218, 112.
55. Ibid., pp. 148-151.
56. Ibid., pp. 151-152.
57. Ibid., pp. 216-217. See also, Wayne J. Urban, "A Philosophical Critique of Michael Katz's Educational History," Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society, 1973, ed. Brian Crittenden, pp. 94-103.
58. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform, pp. 53, 84.
59. Ibid., pp. 20, 273. Katz's description of a "significant majority" of businessmen in favor of the high school refers to an erroneous total on page 273. Katz mistotaled the "votes to abolish" among businessmen; instead of 24 against the high school, as he has it, the actual total of his figures is 28. Thus, instead of a "business" vote of 30-24 in favor of the high school, the actual vote was 30-28 in favor (and four of the votes for the school were cast by "business employees").
60. Ibid., pp. 84, 273.
61. Ibid., p. 86. Alice Felt Tyler, Freedom's Ferment: Phases of American Social History to 1860 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1944), p. 233; Elwood P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States, pp. 164-165; Lawrence A. Cremin, The American Common School (New York: Teachers College Press, 1951), pp. 29, 47, 92; Sidney Jackson, America's Struggle for Free Schools (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942); Merle Curti, The Social Ideas of American

85. Louis Harlan, Separate and Unequal: Public School Campaigns and Racism in the Southern Seaboard States, 1901-1915 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958), pp. 78-80, 92-95, 100, 138, 254-255, 268-269.
86. Henry A. Bullock, A History of Negro Education in the South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 100, 76, 88-89; Horace Mann Bond, The Education of the Negro in the American Social Order (New York: Octagon Books, 1966, orig. pub. 1934), pp. 55, 123-125, 131-132, 141-142, 149-150.
87. Anderson, p. 35; Edgar Gardner Murphy, Problems of the Present South (New York: Macmillan, 1904), pp. 163-164.
88. Anderson, p. 25; United States Senate, Report of the Committee on Education and Labor upon the relations between Labor and Capital (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1885), Volume IV, pp. 772-781.
89. Bowles and Gintis, pp. 8, 13-14, 11, 123, 56, 103.
90. Ibid., pp. 14, 46, 60, 54, 55.
91. Ibid., pp. 62, 276, 265.
92. Ibid., pp. 266, 280, 287, 252.
93. William H. Sewell, "Inequality of Opportunity for Higher Education," American Sociological Review, Volume 36, October 1971, p. 798; Robert M. Hauser and David L. Featherman, "Equality of Access to Schooling: Trends and Prospects," Center for Demography and Ecology, Working Paper 75-17, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1975, pp. 20-21. See also, William H. Sewell and Robert M. Hauser, Education, Occupation, and Earnings: Achievement in the Early Career (New York: Academic Press, 1975), p. 184. In Sewell and Hauser's model, the inheritance of status positions across generations explains "no more than 16% of the variance in educational attainment, 12% of the variance in occupational status, and 4% of the variance in earnings." For descriptions of the social functioning of Soviet education, see Mervyn Matthews, Class and Society in Soviet Russia (New York: Walker, 1972), pp. 269-287, and Mervyn Matthews, "Soviet Students--Some Sociological Perspectives," Soviet Studies, Vol. XXVII, January 1975, No. 1, pp. 86-108.
94. Arthur M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 69; Simon Kuznets, "Demographic Aspects of the Distribution of Income Among Families: Recent Trends in the United States," Econometrics and Economic Theory: Essays in Honor of Jan Tinbergen (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1974), pp. 223-245; Morton Paglin, "The Measurement and Trend of Inequality: A Basic Revision," The American Economic Review, September 1975, Volume 65, No. 4, pp. 602, 606-607.
95. Joel H. Spring, "Anarchism and Education: A Dissenting Tradition," Roots of Crisis, p. 217.
96. Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State, pp. 1, 2, 3-21.
97. Ibid., pp. 49, 56-57, 76, 66-90.
98. Ibid., p. 94.
99. Spring, A Primer of Libertarian Education (New York: Free Life Editions, 1975), pp. 82, 113, 115, 124-126, 137-138, 100.
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